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1. INTRODUCTION

A dramatic saga unfolded as a state supreme court's controversial
decision on the civil definition of marriage set the stage for a widely
publicized ballot initiative.' Once passed by voters, this initiative amended
the state constitution and effectively overturned the state supreme court's
original decision on the issue of marriage.2 This description of unfolding
events may conjure up a unique set of images related to the 2008 passage of
1. See infra notes 8-16, 29-30 and accompanying text.
2. See infra notes 12, 29-30, 90, 134 and accompanying text.
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Proposition 8 in California, but it also describes the events that led to the
1998 ratification of article I, section 23 of the Hawai'i Constitution.' The
events from Hawai'i are presented as an anecdotal illustration of federalist
principles in the area of family law, which prescribe a division of
responsibility between the federal and state governments4 and assign
regulatory authority in the area of family law, absent a constitutional
violation, to the exclusive domain of the states.5 If article I, section 23 of the
Hawai'i Constitution was not deemed unconstitutional on equal protection or
due process grounds, Proposition 8 should not be held unconstitutional
either.6 Additionally, states like Massachusetts, Connecticut, or Vermont,
which recognized same-sex marriage through state supreme court decisions
or state legislative enactments, should have the freedom to define marriage
according to their own set of constitutional processes.'
In May 1993, the Hawai'i Supreme Court in Baehr v. Lewin8 found that
Hawai'i Revised Statute section 572-1, which defined the marriage contract
as being between only a man and a woman, created a sex-based
classification subject to strict scrutiny9 for purposes of equal protection

3. See David Orgon Coolidge, The Hawai'iMarriage Amendment: Its Origins, Meaning and
Fate, 22 U. HAW. L. REv. 19, 20 (2000). There are some minor differences between the events
occurring in both Hawai'i and California. For example, the Hawai'i Supreme Court remanded its
case to a lower court after finding that a state statute, which defined the marital relationship as being
between a man and a woman, was subject to strict scrutiny. Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44, 68 (Haw.
1993). By contrast, the California Supreme Court directly struck down a similar state statute as
unconstitutional. In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d 384, 452-53 (Cal. 2008), superseded by
constitutionalamendment, CAL. CONST. art. I, § 7.5, as recognized in Strauss v. Horton, 207 P.3d
48, 75-76, 122 (Cal. 2009). Additionally, whereas the state constitutional amendment in Hawai'i
gave the state legislature the power to restrict marriage to opposite-sex couples, HAW. CONST. art. I,
§23, Proposition 8 asserted that "[o]nly marriage between a man and a woman is valid or recognized
in California," CAL. CONST. art. I, § 7.5. These minor differences, however, are not legally
significant for purposes of this comment. See infra notes 26-31 and accompanying text.
4. See infra notes 50, 57 and accompanying text.
5. See infra notes 24, 48, 54-58, 68-72 and accompanying text.
6. See infra notes 23-31, 48, 177 and accompanying text.
7. See infra notes 23-24, 80-93 and accompanying text.
8. 852 P.2d 44 (Haw. 1993).
9. There are three recognized levels of judicial scrutiny that apply to enactments challenged on
equal protection grounds. See Neelum J. Wadhwani, RationalReviews, IrrationalResults, 84 TEX.
L. REv. 801, 801, 805-06 (2006). Courts will apply the rational basis standard to the challenged
enactment unless the classification relates to a fundamental right or a suspect or quasi-suspect class.
See Gary Alan Collis, Romer v. Evans: Gay Americans Find Shelter After Stormy Legal Odyssey, 24
PEPP. L. REv. 991, 993-94 (1997). If the classification relates to a fundamental right or a suspect
class, the court will apply strict scrutiny. Id. at 993. Race, ethnicity, and, at times, alienage are
protected as suspect classes under federal law. Richard F. Duncan & Gary L. Young, Homosexual
Rights and Citizen Initiatives:Is Constitutionalism Unconstitutional?,9 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS &
PUB. POL'Y 93, 101 (1995). The Supreme Court has also identified certain factors for determining
whether a particular social group constitutes a suspect class. Collis, supra, at 994. The social group
must demonstrate an immutable characteristic, political powerlessness, and a history of
discrimination. Id. The strict scrutiny test requires the government to demonstrate that the
enactment furthers a compelling state interest and is narrowly tailored to advance that interest. Id. at
993. If the classification relates to a quasi-suspect class, however, the court will apply intermediate
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under article I, section 5 of the Hawai'i Constitution.'o On remand in 1996,
the Circuit Court of Hawai'i held that the Defendant, the State of Hawai'i,
failed to present sufficient evidence to overcome the strict scrutiny standard
and ruled that Hawai'i Revised Statute section 572-1 was unconstitutional
on equal protection grounds." After a period of inaction, public debate, and
political infighting, both chambers of the state legislature passed a
constitutional marriage amendment in April 1997 and, in an effort to
effectively overrule the Lewin decision, placed the amendment before voters
for final ratification. 12
scrutiny. Wadhwani, supra, at 805. Currently, gender and illegitimacy are protected as quasisuspect classes under federal law. Id. The intermediate scrutiny test requires the government to
show that the enactment is substantially related to an important state interest. Id.
10. Lewin, 852 P.2d at 67. The Hawai'i Supreme Court based this finding on the presence of the
equal rights amendment-article 1, section 3-in the Hawai'i Constitution and on the reasoning
from the plurality and concurring opinions in Frontierov. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973). The
equal rights amendment in the Hawai'i Constitution explicitly states that "[e]quality of rights under
the law shall not be denied or abridged by the State on account of sex." HAw. CONST. art. I, § 3.
Even though a plurality of justices in Frontieroindicated that sex-based classifications are subject to
strict scrutiny, three concurring justices declined to rule that sex was a suspect classification. 411
U.S. at 691-92 (Powell, J., concurring). The reason for their concurrence was that Congress had
recently approved the Equal Protection Amendment and submitted the amendment to the states for
ratification, and the concurring justices did not want to subvert the ratification process among each
of the fifty state legislatures. Id. The Hawai'i Supreme Court relied on these opinions from
Frontiero, even though subsequent cases have clearly held that intermediate scrutiny is the
appropriate standard for assessing whether gender-based classifications violate the U.S. Constitution,
because the Hawai'i Supreme Court is free to afford greater protections to its citizens under the state
constitution than those afforded by the U.S. Constitution. Lewin, 852 P.2d at 64-66; see also Craig
v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976) (holding that gender-based classifications are subject to
intermediate scrutiny because they "must serve important governmental objectives and must be
substantially related to achievement of those objectives"); Califano v. Goldfarb, 430 U.S. 199, 209
n.8 (1977) (noting that "gender-based discriminations against men [are subject to intermediate
scrutiny because they] have been invalidated when they do not serve important governmental
objectives and (are not) substantially related to the achievement of those objectives") (internal
quotation mark omitted); Califano v. Webster, 430 U.S. 313, 316-17 (1977) (commenting that
"classifications by gender [are subject to intermediate scrutiny because they] must serve important
governmental objectives and must be substantially related to achievement of those objectives"
(internal quotation mark omitted)). Additionally, Hawai'i had already incorporated the Equal Rights
Amendment as part of its state constitution. See Lewin, 852 P.2d at 67. It is important to note that
the Federal Equal Rights Amendment eventually failed to gain the ratification of enough states in
order to be incorporated as part of the U.S. Constitution. George Hodak, March 22, 1972: Senate
Approves Equal Rights Amendment, 93 A.B.A. J. 72, at 72.
11. Baehr v. Miike, CIV. No. 91-1394, 1996 WL 694235, at *21-22 (Haw. Ct. App. Dec. 3,
1996). The State of Hawai'i did present evidence related to the public benefits of Hawai'i Revised
Statute section 572-1, but after applying the strict scrutiny standard mandated by the Hawai'i
Supreme Court, the circuit court was not persuaded that the statute furthered a compelling state
interest. Id.
12. See Coolidge, supra note 3, at 28-82. There was disagreement on the actual meaning and
effect of the amendment with respect to the Lewin decision. Id. at 108. In a summary disposition
opinion in December 1999, the Hawai'i Supreme Court sidestepped the issue by deciding that the
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Before the Hawai'i Supreme Court was able to address the 1996 circuit
court opinion and after a big media stir of campaign coverage, sixty-nine
percent of voters ratified the Hawai'i marriage amendment on November 3,
1998." As in the later Proposition 8 saga, where the California Supreme
Court decided the legality of a state marriage amendment and ruled on the
issue of its retroactivity,14 the Hawai'i Supreme Court was asked to decide
whether the Hawai'i marriage amendment legally validated Hawai'i Revised
Statute section 572-1 and whether or not the amendment had a retroactive
effect." In the end, the Hawai'i Supreme Court declared the case moot and
reversed the circuit court decision. 6
Alaska also encountered a comparable scenario during the same time
period." In February 1998, an Alaskan superior court judge in Brause v.
8
found that the right to choose one's life partner is
Bureau of Vital Statistics1
a fundamental right that is protected through the right to privacy, and thus,
the State of Alaska must show a compelling state interest in restricting
marriage to opposite-sex couples.' 9 In response, the state legislature passed

amendment took Hawai'i Revised Statute section 572-1 out of the ambit of article 1, section 5 of the
Hawai'i Constitution, thereby mandating that the statute be treated as constitutional. Id. at 109. The
Hawai'i Supreme Court did not even reference the Lewin decision in its summary disposition
opinion. Id. at 111.
13. See id. at 20, 95-102. The text of the Hawai'i marriage amendment states: "The legislature
shall have the power to reserve marriage to opposite-sex couples." HAW. CONST. art. 1, §23.
14. See Strauss v. Horton, 207 P.3d 48, 114, 119 (Cal. 2009). The California Supreme Court
ruled that Proposition 8 constituted a valid constitutional amendment rather than a revision to the
California Constitution, and therefore, Proposition 8 was appropriately presented to voters for
approval through the initiative process. See id. at 114. Additionally, the California Supreme Court
decided that Proposition 8 should apply prospectively from the date of its passage rather than
retroactively to invalidate the estimated 18,000 same-sex marriages that were previously performed
in the State of California. Id. at 119, 121.
15. Coolidge, supra note 3, at 106-07. The Hawai'i Supreme Court did not directly answer
either question on appeal. On the issue of legal validation of Hawai'i Revised Statute section 572-1,
the Hawai'i Supreme Court decided that the statute should be given "full force and effect," which
implied that the state legislature was not required to re-pass the statute. Id. at 110-11. On the issue
of retroactivity, the circuit court judge had stayed the 1996 circuit court decision pending appeal, and
as a result, no same-sex marriage licenses had been issued prior to passage of the marriage
amendment. See id. at 41. Rather than address retroactivity directly, the Hawai'i Supreme Court
simply declared the issue moot. Id. at I10.
16. Id. at 109.
17. See infra text accompanying notes 18-22.
18. No. 3AN-95-6562 CI, 1998 WL 88743 (Alaska Super. Ct. Feb. 27, 1998).
19. Id. at *4-6. The right to privacy has been implied through the liberty interest in the Alaska
Constitution as the right to be let alone. Breese v. Smith, 501 P.2d 159, 171-72 (Alaska 1972).
Additionally, the Alaska Constitution guarantees that "[tihe right of the people to privacy is
recognized and shall not be infringed." ALASKA CONST. art. I, § 22. There are a number of Alaska
Supreme Court decisions, however, that demonstrate that the right to privacy should not be extended
to instances of public behavior. See, e.g., Doe v. Alaska Superior Court, Third Judicial Dist., 721
P.2d 617, 629 (Alaska 1986) (holding that right to privacy does not apply to a court order in libel
action requiring governor to disclose private citizens' correspondence petitioning government on a
matter of public importance). Similarly, the right to choose one's life partner may be a private
decision, but government recognition of that decision should have the legal significance of
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a constitutional marriage amendment and placed it before voters for
ratification.20 On the same day that voters passed a marriage amendment in
Hawai'i, November 3, 1998, sixty-eight percent of voters in Alaska ratified
their own marriage amendment. 21 After ratification of the amendment, the
state legislature requested that the Brause case be dismissed as moot, and the
Alaska Supreme Court eventually affirmed the superior court's decision to
dismiss the case for lack of standing.22
These cases in Hawai'i and Alaska illustrate important federalist
principles because these states were allowed to conclusively resolve the
definition of marriage in accordance with their own set of constitutional
processes.23 Federalism divides political responsibility between federal and
state government and prescribes regulation in the area of family law,
including marriage, as an issue of traditional state concern as long as the
regulation does not violate individual rights guaranteed in the U.S.
Constitution.24 Additionally, the Hawai'i and Alaska case scenarios can be
used to draw overarching factual and legal comparisons between the
ratification of constitutional marriage amendments in Hawai'i and Alaska,
and the ratification of Proposition 8 in California.25
constituting a public act. See Kevin G. Clarkson et al., The Alaska Marriage Amendment: The
People's Choice on the Last Frontier, 16 ALASKA L. REv. 213, 223-24 (1999). But cf Patrick J.
Shipley, Constitutionalityof the Defense of MarriageAct, 11 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 117, 120
(2000) (noting the U.S. Supreme Court's reluctance to classify marriage as a public act for purposes
of the U.S. Constitution's Full Faith and Credit Clause, which would require interstate recognition of
same-sex marriage). The Full Faith and Credit Clause provides that every state in the Union must
recognize "the public Acts, Records, and judicial Proceedings" of each sister state. U.S. CONST. art.
IV, § 1; see also infra note 74 and accompanying text.
20. See Clarkson et al., supra note 19, at 226-36.
21. Id. at 244. The text of the Alaska marriage amendment states: "To be valid or recognized in
this State, a marriage may exist only between one man and one woman." ALASKA CONST. art. 1, §
25.
22. Eric J. Lobsinger, A National Model for Reconciling Equal Protectionfor Same-Sex Couples
with State MarriageAmendments: Alaska Civil Liberties Union ex. rel Carter v. Alaska, 23 ALASKA
L. REV. 117, 122 (2006).
23. See supra notes 8-22 and accompanying text.
24. See Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 379 (1971) ("[A] statute or a rule may be held
constitutionally invalid as applied when it operates to deprive an individual of a protected right
although its general validity as a measure enacted in the legitimate exercise of state power is beyond
question."); Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U.S. 393, 404 (1975) (asserting that domestic relations is "an area
that has long been regarded as a virtually exclusive province of the States"); Pennoyer v. Neff, 95
U.S. 714, 734-35 (1877) ("The State ... has absolute right to prescribe the conditions upon which
the marriage relation between its own citizens shall be created, and the causes for which it may be
dissolved."), overruled on other grounds by Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 212 n.39 (1977);
Barber v. Barber, 62 U.S. 582, 584 (1858) (declaring that the Supreme Court disclaims "altogether
any jurisdiction in the courts of the United States upon the subject of divorce, or for the allowance of
alimony").
25. See infra notes 26-31 and accompanying text.
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The events in Hawai'i, Alaska, and California are all comparable.26
Like the Hawai'i and Alaska supreme courts, which found that each state's
traditional marriage statute was subject to heightened scrutiny,27 the
California Supreme Court granted the right of same-sex marriage after
determining that California's Proposition 22, enacted into law in March
2000, was subject to strict scrutiny.28 As in Hawai'i and Alaska, where the
state court's decision precipitated a campaign to amend the state constitution
by popular referendum,2 9 the California Supreme Court decision on the issue
of marriage induced a ballot initiative to overturn the specific holding of the

26. See infra notes 27-31 and accompanying text.
27. See supra notes 10, 19 and accompanying text. The Hawai'i Supreme Court never decided
whether Hawai'i Revised Statute section 572-1 met the strict scrutiny standard as required by its
decision in Lewin. See Coolidge, supra note 3, at 24-26, 96. After the case was remanded to the
circuit court, the government failed to show sufficient evidence to meet the strict scrutiny standard.
Id. at 20, 24-26, 41.
The circuit court declared Hawai'i Revised Statute section 572-1
unconstitutional, and the appeal of the decision was already complete by the time the state legislature
placed the proposed constitutional marriage amendment before voters for ratification on November
3, 1998. Id. at 41, 96. The Hawai'i Supreme Court had the opportunity to issue a preemptive
decision before voters could vote on the amendment, but the court chose to exercise restraint. Id. at
96. Additionally, the Alaska Supreme Court never decided whether the State of Alaska could
constitutionally limit marriage to opposite-sex couples because voters ratified a constitutional
marriage amendment after the Alaska Supreme Court declined to review the decision of an Alaskan
superior court judge. Clarkson et al., supra note 19, at 215, 224. In California, however, the state
supreme court decided the fate of the state's traditional marriage statute before voters had the
opportunity to ratify a constitutional marriage amendment. See Strauss v. Horton, 207 P.3d 48, 66
(Cal. 2009). Still, this minor difference between Hawai'i, Alaska, and California is not significant
for purposes of this anecdotal comparison.
28. In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d 384, 409, 452-53 (Cal. 2008), superseded by CAL. CONST.
art. I, § 7.5, as recognized in Strauss, 207 P.3d at 75-76, 122. Proposition 22 was the traditional
marriage statute passed by California voters in March 2000. Strauss, 207 P.3d at 65. The language
of Proposition 22 was exactly the same as that of Proposition 8. Id. at 59, 65. Proposition 22
provided the following: "Only marriage between a man and a woman is valid or recognized in
California." Id. at 65. The identical language between both propositions led the California Supreme
Court to conclude in Strauss that Proposition 8 had the same operative effect as Proposition 22 and
was intended merely as a rejection of its decision in In re Marriage Cases. Id. at 76.
29. See supra notes 12-13, 20-21 and accompanying text. The state constitution of Hawai'i can
either be amended by constitutional convention or by a legislatively proposed amendment. HAW.
CONST. art. XVII, § 1. A constitutional amendment proposed by the state legislature must be
approved by two-thirds of each chamber if voted on in a single session or by a majority of each
chamber if voted on in two successive sessions. Id. at § 3. Once either of these requirements is met,
the proposed amendment must receive majority approval by the voters in order to be ratified as part
of the Hawai'i state constitution. Id. at §§ 2-3. On April 29, 1997, the Hawai'i constitutional
marriage amendment passed the state senate by unanimous vote and the state house on the same day
with forty-four in favor, six opposed, and one excused, which constituted passage by roughly eightysix percent. See Coolidge, supra note 3, at 82. The people of Hawai'i later ratified the amendment
with sixty-nine percent of the vote on November 3, 1998. Id. at 20. The constitutional amendment
process in Alaska requires a similar two-thirds vote in each chamber of the state legislature and a
majority vote by the people in the next general election. See ALASKA CONST. art. XIII, § 1. After
receiving the requisite approval by the state legislature, the Alaska constitutional marriage
amendment was ratified on November 3, 1998, with sixty-eight percent of the vote. Clarkson et al.,
supra note 19, at 236, 244.
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In re Marriage Cases decision. 0 Just as Hawai'i and Alaska could
conclusively resolve the civil definition of marriage in the wake of a state
court decision to the contrary, without federal intervention, California and
the rest of the states in the Union should be able to do the same.
This article will argue that existing precedent does not support a finding
that Proposition 8 violates the U.S. Constitution on either equal protection or
due process grounds.3 2 In fact, existing precedent in Washington v.
Glucksberg" actually supports the opposite conclusion.3 4 Part II of this
article discusses the history of marriage and its civil recognition in this
country, and the development of federalist principles in the area of family
law." Part III of this article discusses the current state of marriage and the
gradual decline of federalism as an affirmative limit on the federal
government's power in the area of family law." Part IV of this article
analyzes some of the current precedent from the U.S. Supreme Court on
issues of equal protection and due process, and argues that much of this
precedent, except Glucksberg, is distinguishable with respect to Proposition
8.1 Part V of this article addresses the legal implications for this country's
federalist system of government if the federal court system decides to strike
Finally, Part VI provides a
down Proposition 8 as unconstitutional.

30. See Strauss, 207 P.3d at 76-77. The California Constitution can be amended through a
voter-initiated amendment process if the text of the amendment is presented to the Secretary of State
with a total amount of voter signatures equaling eight percent of all the votes cast in the last
gubernatorial election. CAL. CONST. art. II, § 8. On June 2, 2008, the California Secretary of State
certified that Proposition 8 had obtained enough signatures to qualify as a constitutional amendment
in the general election on November 4, 2008. Strauss, 207 P.3d at 68.
31. See supra notes 23-30 and accompanying text.
32. See infra notes 111-201 and accompanying text.
33. 521 U.S. 702 (1997).
34. See infra notes 107, 172, 175, 177, 211-13 and accompanying text. According to the
Supreme Court in Glucksberg, it has "'always been reluctant to expand the concept of substantive
due process because guideposts for responsible decisionmaking in this unchartered area are scarce
and open-ended."' Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 720 (quoting Collins v. City of Harker Heights, 503 U.S.
115, 125 (1992)). Additionally, "[a] similar restraint marks our approach to the questions whether
an asserted substantive right is entitled to heightened solicitude under the Equal Protection
Clause. . . ." Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 503 n.10 (1977) (plurality opinion).
When the Supreme Court extends "constitutional protection to an asserted right or liberty interest,
[it], to a great extent, place[s] the matter outside the arena of public debate and legislative action."
Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 720. Thus, the Court must "exercise the utmost care whenever [it is] asked
to break new ground in this field," Collins, 503 U.S. at 125, "lest the liberty protected by the Due
Process Clause be subtly transformed into the policy preferences of the Members of [the Supreme
Court]," Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 720 (citing Moore, 431 U.S. at 502 (plurality opinion)).
35. See infra notes 40-72 and accompanying text.
36. See infra notes 73-110 and accompanying text.
37. See infra notes 111-201 and accompanying text.
38. See infra notes 202-14 and accompanying text.
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conclusion on the constitutionality of Proposition 8 and argues that
federalism in the regulation of family law, including the definition of
marriage, should be preserved.
II. THE HISTORY OF MARRIAGE AND ITS PLACE IN THE FEDERALIST
SYSTEM

A. Societal Norms and Civil Recognition ofMarriage

Centuries before Proposition 8, during the founding era of this country,
the dominant conception of marriage and the family consisted of a man and
a woman living together in matrimony with their biological children. 4 0 This
understanding of marriage and the family continued throughout the
nineteenth and twentieth centuries until dramatic demographic changes
occurred in the 1960s.41 The number of cohabitating opposite-sex couples
began to rise as laws criminalizing sex outside of marriage were repealed or
overturned.4 2 It was not until the 2000s, however, that legally recognized
same-sex marriage even became a possibility in this country.4 3
39. See infra notes 215-26 and accompanying text.
40. Courtney G. Joslin, The Evolution of the American Family, 36 HUM. RTS. 2, 2 (2009).
During the founding era, divorce was a rare occurrence and could only be granted through a special
act of the state legislature. Id. Additionally, during this period, there were marital restrictions
placed on African-Americans because they were barred from marrying someone of a different race.
See Keith E. Sealing, Blood Will Tell: Scientific Racism and the Legal Prohibitions Against
Miscegenation, 5 MICH. J. RACE & L. 559, 560-61 (2000). There is a long history of legal
discrimination against African-Americans in the area of marriage and the family. See id. at 560.
Anti-miscegenation laws remained in effect in the colonies and in the United States for over 300
years. Id. At the time the U.S. Supreme Court finally declared all anti-miscegenation laws
unconstitutional, see Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967), there were statutes and constitutional
provisions in sixteen states that prohibited interracial marriage, see Sealing, supra, at 560. As will
be discussed later in this comment, however, the Supreme Court's decision in Loving is
distinguishable from California's enactment of Proposition 8. See infra notes 180-201 and
accompanying text.
41. Joslin, supra note 40, at 3. By 2000, these changes relating to marriage and the family were
so dramatic that Justice Sandra Day O'Connor commented as follows: "The demographic changes of
the past century make it difficult to speak of an average American family. The composition of
families varies greatly from household to household. While many children may have two married
parents and grandparents who visit regularly, many other children are raised in single-parent
households." Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 63-64 (2000).
42. Joslin, supra note 40, at 3.
43. Id. at 4-5. In 1989, Denmark became the first country to provide same-sex couples with a
method of having their relationships legally recognized by the government. Craig A. Sloane, A Rose
by Any Other Name: Marriage and the Danish Registered PartnershipAct, 5 CARDOZO J. INT'L &
COMP. L. 189, 200 (1997). The Danish Registered Partnership Act provided same-sex couples with
all the legal rights and benefits of marriage. Id. at 200-01. Norway and Sweden soon passed similar
laws in 1993 and 1994, respectively. Id. at 200. These developments actually preceded domestic
partnership legislation in California, which was offered to same-sex couples in 1999. Meghan
McCalla, The "Socially Endorsed, Legally Framed,Normative Template": What Has In re Marriage
Cases Really Done for Same-Sex Marriage?, I EST. PLAN. & COMMUNITY PROP. L.J. 203, 215
(2008). Today, Belgium, Canada, the Netherlands, Norway, Spain, South Africa, and Sweden have
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Civil recognition of marriage has its roots in eighteenth century English
law with the passage of Lord Hardwicke's Marriage Act of 1753." This Act
was the first intervention by the state in regulating marriage, and even
though the Act was later repealed, it set the stage for a series of laws that
would challenge ecclesiastical dominance in the regulation of marriage.4
Later, as state regulation of marriage developed in the United States, many
licensing and registration frameworks were optional and not thoroughly
enforced.4 As a result, marriage in this country did not achieve its current
conception as a clearly demarcated legal status until the twentieth century
when government officials became concerned with issues of fraud and

allowed government recognition of same-sex marriage. Kenneth Mck Norrie, Recognition of
Overseas Same-Sex Relationships in New Zealand, 23 N.Z.U.L.R. 339, 340 (2009). Additionally,
the Czech Republic, Finland, Germany, Hungary, Iceland, Luxembourg, New Zealand, Slovenia,
Switzerland, and the United Kingdom provide some form of civil union status or benefits to samesex couples. Id.
44. Hazel D. Lord, Husband and Wife: English Marriage Law from 1750: A Bibliographic
Essay, 11 S. CAL. REv. L. & WOMEN'S STUD. 1, 1 (2001). Before 1753, ecclesiastical courts
maintained almost exclusive authority in the area of marriage law. Id. At the time, marriage was
defined as "'the voluntary union for life of one man and one woman, to the exclusion of all others,"'
and the Church allowed boys as old as fourteen and girls as old as twelve to enter into the marriage
sacrament. Id. at 3 (quoting Hyde v. Hyde, L.R. 130, 133 (P. & D. 1866)). Marriage vows could not
be undone, and given the ease of making these vows, ecclesiastical institutions began requiring
certain formalities, including the presence of clergy and other witnesses, for marriage under canon
law. Id. at 3-4. Despite efforts to enforce these formalities, couples were entering into irregular or
clandestine marriages that did not meet canon requirements. Id. at 4. Lord Hardwicke's Marriage
Act of 1753 was simply a product of societal efforts to reduce marriage irregularity in England.
Leah Leneman, The Scottish Case that Led to Hardwicke's MarriageAct, 17 LAW & HIST. REV. 161,
169 (1999). The Act had the ultimate effect of declaring that clandestine marriages were not validly
recognized civil unions. Lord, supra, at 7.
45. Lord, supra note 44, at 1. The growth of the Methodist and Baptist denominations created
growing opposition to Lord Hardwicke's Marriage Act because the 1753 Act gave the Church of
England a virtual monopoly over marriage ceremonies. Id. at 9-10. After a period of intense
lobbying, Parliament passed the Marriage Act of 1836, which allowed marriage ceremonies within
other religious denominations and provided that newly-appointed civil registrars could issue
marriage licenses. Id. at 10. The 1836 Act also allowed for purely secular marriages that could be
performed in the civil registrar's office. Id. Thus, this Act had the effect of creating civil marriage
apart from religious marriage. Id. Subsequent legislation made minor changes to the system, but it
remains largely intact up to the present day. Id.
46. Kristin A. Collins, AdministeringMarriage:Marriage-BasedEntitlements, Bureaucracy,and
the Legal Constructionof the Family, 62 VAND. L. REv. 1085, 1118 (2009). During the nineteenth
century, because marital registration laws were not thoroughly enforced, state courts played a larger
role than state legislatures in the regulation of marriage. Id. at 1118-19. These courts generally
favored the recognition of marriages through liberal evidentiary rules and, in most states, the
doctrine of common law marriage. Id. at 1119. According to the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court
of Judicature in the State of New York, marriage could "be proved ... from cohabitation, reputation,
acknowledgment of the parties, reception in the family, and other circumstances from which a
marriage may be inferred. No formal solemnization of marriage was requisite." Fenton v. Reed, 4
Johns. 52, 52 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1809) (per curiam) (citation omitted).
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convenience in the administration of new government programs that offered
benefits to either married couples or on the basis of marital status. 4 7
B. Federalism in Family Law-An Area of TraditionalState Concern

Even before marriage became a well-documented legal status, family
law in the United States was viewed as being an area of traditional state
concern because of certain federalist principles in the Constitution.48
Federalism can be understood as the appropriate relationship between the
federal government and the states as defined by "various constitutional
grants of authority to, and limitations on, both federal and state
governments."49 The framers of the U.S. Constitution envisioned the

47. Collins, supra note 46, at 1121. There were concerns about the impact that common law
marriage would have on workers' compensation or social security programs. Cynthia Grant
Bowman, A Feminist Proposal to Bring Back Common Law Marriage, 75 OR. L. REV. 709, 746
(1996). With the social security system, for example, a large number of benefits are not only
conditioned on marital status, but the federal statute enacting the social security system also required
reliance on state marriage laws to determine marital status. Id. When faced with this new challenge,
government officials recommended that common law marriage be abolished rather than devote the
time and attention needed to meet this new administrative challenge. Id. at 746-47. At about the
same time, states began abolishing common law marriage and imposing stricter licensing and
registration requirements on marriage. Collins, supra note 46, at 1121-22.
48. See, e.g., Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1, 12 (2004) (quoting In re
Burrus, 136 U.S. 586 (1890) to reassert the principle that "[tihe whole subject of the domestic
relations of husband and wife, parent and child, belongs to the laws of the States and not to the laws
of the United States"); see also Lynn D. Wardle, Tyranny, Federalism, and the FederalMarriage
Amendment, 17 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 221, 221 (2005) (asserting that "[t]he principle of 'federalism
in family law' is long-established and deeply embedded in the United States"). But cf Jill Elaine
Hasday, The Canon of Family Law, 57 STAN. L. REV. 825, 870-84 (2004) (challenging the notion
that family law is an exclusively local concern and arguing that federal intervention in the area of
family law is not necessarily unprecedented or inappropriate). Although federal law governs a
number of areas that pertain to the family or directly or indirectly affect family life, such as taxation,
immigration, and bankruptcy, the U.S. Constitution explicitly grants regulatory authority to the
federal government in these areas. See Anne C. Dailey, Federalism and Families, 143 U. PA. L.
REV. 1787, 1884-85 (1995). The U.S. Constitution provides that "[t]he Congress shall have Power
To lay and collect Taxes, Duties, Imposts and Excises, . . . [and] [t]o establish a[] uniform Rule of
Naturalization, and uniform Laws on the subject of Bankruptcies throughout the United States . . . ."
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cis. 1, 4. Additionally, the expanding scope of federal legislation in the
twentieth and twenty-first centuries has ensured that the federal government encounters the family in
a multitude of different ways. See Dailey, supra, at 1884. Despite this overlap in spheres of
sovereignty between the federal government and the states, the core domain of family law can still
be properly characterized as constituting a traditional state concern because actual pronouncements
of marriage, divorce, alimony, and child custody are still regulated by the states. See id. at 1821
n. 113. But cf Shayna M. Sigman, Everything Lawyers Know About Polygamy Is Wrong, 16
CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 101, 118-34 (2006) (discussing the federal government's attempts to
eliminate polygamy through various legislation and the challenges polygamy created for Utah in its
attempts to achieve statehood).
49. Sonny Swazo, The Future of High-Level Nuclear Waste Disposal, State Sovereignty and the
Tenth Amendment: Nevada v. Watkins, 36 NAT. RESOURCES J. 127, 137 (1996). One example of
federalism in the Constitution is the Tenth Amendment, which provides that "[t]he powers not
delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to
the States respectively, or to the people." U.S. CONST. amend. X. The original purpose and primary
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national government as having certain substantive limits on its sphere of
authority.so Additionally, federalism was designed to serve not only as a
check on the accumulation of power in the federal government but also as a
means for citizens to hold their government accountable.5 '
Federalism provides a mechanism for the clear division of political
responsibility, which provides citizens with some knowledge of which
governmental body to hold accountable for failure to perform a particular
function of the Tenth Amendment was to serve as a substantive limit on federal power. See Gary
Lawson, A Truism with Attitude: The Tenth Amendment in ConstitutionalContext, 83 NOTRE DAME
L. REV. 469, 471 (2008). In fact, James Madison envisioned the Tenth Amendment as precluding
the federal government from exercising any power that was not contained explicitly in the
Constitution. Kurt T. Lash, James Madison's CelebratedReport of 1800: The Transformationof the
Tenth Amendment, 74 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 165, 168 (2006). As a result of this restraint on federal
power, the Tenth Amendment also created a residual realm of state sovereignty. See Dailey, supra
note 48, at 1797-98. Despite the Tenth Amendment's limit on federal power, however, the Supreme
Court developed an expansive interpretation of Congress's implied powers in McCulloch v.
Maryland, 17 U.S. 316, 406-15 (1819). In McCulloch, the Court ruled on the constitutionality of the
Bank of the United States and whether Congress had the power to bring the Bank into existence.
McCulloch, 17 U.S. at 317-19. Chief Justice John Marshall articulated the principle that the express
powers granted to Congress under Article I also implied an ability to choose the best means of
effectuating those powers. Grant S. Nelson & Robert J. Pushaw, Jr., Rethinking the Commerce
Clause: Applying First Principlesto Uphold Federal Commercial Regulations but Preserve State
Control over Social Issues, 85 IOWA L. REv. 1, 56 n.233 (1999). According to Marshall, the
Necessary and Proper Clause in Article I, which gives Congress the power "(t]o make all Laws
which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into Execution the foregoing Powers," U.S. CONST.
art. I, § 8, cl. 18, simply provided confirmation of this principle, Nelson & Pushaw, supra, at 56
n.233.
50. See Dailey, supra note 48, at 1796-98. Even though the Supreme Court adopted an
expansive view of congressional powers in McCulloch, see supra note 49, a number of early
decisions under the Commerce Clause also served an important role in placing broad limits on
federal power, Dailey, supra note 48, at 1797-98. The Commerce Clause implied a correlative
sphere of state authority over issues of local concern because the U.S. Constitution granted express
authority for Congress to regulate interstate economic activity. See, e.g., Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S.
1, 194 (1824) (clarifying that the meaning of the Commerce Clause cannot be construed as referring
to commerce "which is completely internal, which is carried on between man and man in a State, or
between different parts of the same State, and which does not extend to or affect other States"). In
Gibbons, the Court interpreted the Commerce Clause as granting an expansive power to Congress in
regulating commerce among the several states. See Nelson & Pushaw, supra note 49, at 57-63.
First, the Court defined commerce not only as the buying and selling of goods but also as all
commercial intercourse, which included activities associated with the buying and selling of goods,
such as navigation. Gibbons, 22 U.S. at 190-92, 215-18. Second, the Court defined "among the
several states" as including intrastate matters that may affect commerce in other states. Id. at 19597, 204. These early Commerce Clause cases, however, articulated a residual sphere of state
sovereignty that allowed states to exercise control over matters that were noncommercial or not
among the several states, which provided states with certain police powers to regulate the public
health, safety, and welfare of its citizens. See Nelson & Pushaw, supra note 49, at 61-63.
Ironically, Marshall's own interpretation of the Commerce Clause in Gibbons was invoked during
the New Deal era as a justification for expanding the scope of Congress's power beyond the
substantive limits of the Commerce Clause. Id. at 63.
51. United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 576-77 (1995) (Kennedy, J., concurring).
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political function.5 2 In fact, "the resultant inability to hold either branch of
the government answerable to the citizens is more dangerous even than
devolving too much authority to the remote central power." 3 Federalism
provides a context for understanding why the framers and subsequent
generations of jurists have all asserted that family law is of traditional state
concern.54 This context of federalism also demonstrates that family law did
not develop into an area of traditional state concern as a result of arbitrary
ideas or decisions." Localism in family law serves an important function in
protecting against tyranny and preserving this country's republican form of
government. Structurally, state regulation of family law was designed as a
mechanism for restraining the reach of the national government into the area
of family life, thereby promoting individual liberty. Furthermore, localism
in family law serves the purpose of promoting civic virtue and republican
ideals."
52. Id. A clear division of political responsibility is crucial to the theory that a constitutional
system with two governments will afford more liberty to the people than it would if there were only
one government. See id. at 576. This theory is premised on James Madison's expectation that each
of the governments will restrain each other through a competitive process of vying for the affections
of the people. Id. at 567-77.
53. Id. at 577. To a large degree, the federalist balance between the national and state
government depends on and is preserved by the political process. Id. Each branch of government,
however, is obligated to preserve and protect all aspects of the Constitution, including the
government's federalist structure. Id. Even though Congress has a substantial impact on the
federalist balance, there are disincentives related to political convenience that require the judiciary to
preserve and protect the federal balance as well. Id. at 576-78.
54. See infra notes 56-58 and accompanying text.
55. See Wardle, supra note 48, at 231-34, 240-41. Jill Elaine Hasday argues that jurists
frequently cite historical practice as a primary justification for localism in family law without
articulating the doctrine's rational underpinnings. See Jill Elaine Hasday, Federalism and the
Family Reconstructed,45 UCLA L. REV. 1297, 1301-19 (1998). Alternatively, it is more likely that
the principle for localism in family law has become so widely accepted and pervasive as to render
clear articulation and constant justification of its rational underpinnings unnecessary. See infra notes
56-72 and accompanying text.
56. See infra notes 57-58 and accompanying text.
57. See Wardle, supra note 48, at 226-27. Family life has traditionally been viewed as a refuge
from the individualistic and amoral aspects of the public sphere. Dailey, supra note 48, at 1827.
The domestic sphere is the place where individuals develop personal values and ideals apart from
governmental mandates. Id. Although the government often exerts a strong influence in regulating
the domestic sphere, there are certain limits placed on regulation in this area. Id. at 1827-31.
Additionally, there are defined roles for both the federal and the state governments in regulating
aspects of the domestic sphere. Id. at 1825; see also infra notes 66, 68-72 and accompanying text.
Governmental regulation of what constitutes "the good family life" requires individuals to express
their own moral vision through the deliberative process of communitarian decision-making. Dailey,
supra note 48, at 1872-75. State authority in this regard preserves individual liberty because state
regulation reduces the inherent risk in heterogeneous societies that this process will degenerate into a
widespread imposition of a defined moral code. Id.
58. Wardle, supra note 48, at 232-33. The framers of the U.S. Constitution envisioned that a
variety of local institutions, such as families, churches, and schools, would provide a necessary role
in preserving the constitutional system. See id. at 249-51. These institutions fostered certain virtues
among the citizenry that laid the essential foundation for a republican form of government. See id. at
249. Situated at the heart of this essential foundation was the importance of marriage and the family,
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A number of important principles have developed in U.S. constitutional
jurisprudence as a result of the doctrine that family law is a matter of
traditional state concern.59 First, in 1859, the Supreme Court recognized in
dicta that federal courts do not have jurisdiction over "the subject of divorce,
or for the allowance of alimony."60 This assertion in dicta later formed the
basis of the domestic relations exception to federal court jurisdiction, and
this exception came to encompass a whole range of cases, including those
involving pronouncements of marriage, divorce, alimony, and child
custody.6 In 1992, the U.S. Supreme Court affirmed the domestic relations
exception in Ankenbrandt v. Richards,62 but it gave little guidance to circuit
and district courts on the exception's proper scope and application.6 The
Court also noted that the continued recognition of the exception in previous

serving as a school of civic virtue for the next generation of citizens. Id. at 251. These republican
virtues include, among others, participation in the political system, respect for differing viewpoints,
critical dialogue and deliberation, honesty, reasonableness, and rational thought. Dailey, supra note
48, at 1835-40. Many critics would argue, however, that these virtues can be better instilled in
children in school rather than at home. Id. at 1839-40. This viewpoint neglects consideration of the
most important republican virtue-autonomy. See id. at 1840. This virtue gives future generations a
reason to value liberty and resist tyranny. See Wardle, supra note 48, at 232-33. As a result,
"[fjederalism in this context destroys the federal government's power to mold the moral character of
future citizens in its own uniform image." Dailey, supra note 48, at 1820.
59. See infra notes 60-67 and accompanying text.
60. Barber v. Barber, 62 U.S. 582, 584 (1859). The U.S. Supreme Court based this decision on
the historical argument that federal court jurisdiction only extended to matters within the scope of
English law and equity powers. See Michael Ashley Stein, The Domestic Relations Exception to
FederalJurisdiction:Rethinking an Unsettled Federal Courts Doctrine, 36 B.C. L. REV. 669, 67375 (1995). At the time the U.S. Constitution was adopted, issues of divorce and alimony were
strictly within the jurisdiction of English ecclesiastical courts. See id. While the Court disclaimed
jurisdiction over divorce and alimony pronouncements, it did assert jurisdiction over the
enforcement of such decrees as being matters within both English and federal court jurisdiction. Id.
at 675. The dissent argued, however, that Article III courts completely lacked jurisdiction over
domestic relations issues. Id. at 676.
61. Stein, supra note 60, at 669-70. Thirty years later, the U.S. Supreme Court used the dicta
from Barber as precedent for In re Burrus. Id. at 676. There, the Court asserted that "[t]he whole
subject of the domestic relations of husband and wife, parent and child, belongs to the laws of the
states, and not to the laws of the United States." In re Burrus, 136 U.S. 586, 593-94 (1890).
Domestic relations cases can be divided up into four classifications of cases arising under both
diversity and federal question jurisdiction. Stein, supra note 60, at 669-70. These four
classifications include the following: (1) core cases, (2) claims regarding the enforcement of decrees
in core cases, (3) injury claims with respect to the rights decreed in core cases, and (4) claims
regarding constitutional or other federal violations of the rights decreed in core cases. Id. Core
cases are those involving pronouncements of marriage, divorce, alimony, and child custody. Id.
Even though there is considerable debate on the scope of the domestic relations exception, there is
widespread agreement among jurists that the exception extends to core cases under the first
classification. Id. at 679.
62. 504 U.S. 689 (1992).
63. See Stein, supra note 60, at 671.
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cases rested "upon the virtually exclusive primacy at that time of the States
in the regulation of domestic relations."'
Second, the Supreme Court has set a high standard of deference for
instances where state family law conflicts with a federal statute.s In these
cases, the Court has held that state family law and family property law
should only be preempted if there will be "major damage" to a "clear and
substantial" federal interest if the state law is applied. According to the
Court, the rationale behind this deferential standard is the constitutional
theory and precedent that requires attentiveness to state concerns, especially
in the area of family law.67
The notion that family law is a matter of traditional state concern,
however, does not preclude the federal government from regulating certain
aspects of the domestic sphere. While localism in family law and in other
areas of law, which have traditionally been governed by the states, ensures
autonomy and preserves individual liberty, there must also be a check on
the state's ability to violate certain classically liberal values." As a result,
the federal government has the responsibility of ensuring that certain
individual rights, such as equality, privacy, and parental authority, continue
64. Ankenbrandt v. Richards, 504 U.S. 689, 714 (1992). Contrary to Hasday's argument, see
supra note 55, this quote lends credence to the idea that localism in family law was based on the
framers' understanding of federalism and the importance of family life in restraining tyranny and
cultivating republican virtues rather than on justifications of historical legal practice. See supra
notes 56-58 and accompanying text.
65. See Hisquierdo v. Hisquierdo, 439 U.S. 572, 581 (1979). A conflict between state family law
and a federal statute creates constitutional implications under the Supremacy Clause. See id. The
Supremacy Clause provides the following: "This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States
which shall be made in Pursuance thereof. . . shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges
in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the
Contrary notwithstanding." U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
66. United States v. Yazell, 382 U.S. 341, 352 (1966). Even in light of the Supremacy Clause,
the Supreme Court has found that the federal law must directly conflict with state law in order for
the federal law to preempt a state family law or family property law statute. Hisquierdo,439 U.S. at
581. A conflict in language is not enough. Id. This rule of preemption also reflects the distinct
roles that federal and state government play in regulating aspects of the domestic sphere. See
Dailey, supra note 48, at 1825. State governments have the primary responsibility of integrating
communitarian values into a shared vision of what constitutes "the good family life." Id. The
federal government should not intervene in the moral domain of family law, but the federal
government's role in regulating family life does include protecting vital national interests, such as
issues of individual rights. Id.
67. Yazell, 382 U.S. at 352.
68. See Wardle, supra note 48, at 233.
69. See supranotes 56-58 and accompanying text.
70. Dailey, supra note 48, at 1872; see, e.g., Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 385 (1971)
("The power of the States over marriage and divorce is, of course, complete except as limited by
specific constitutional provisions.") (Douglas, J., concurring); Labine v. Vincent, 401 U.S. 532, 53839 (1971) ("[T]he power to make rules to establish, protect, and strengthen family life as well as to
regulate the disposition of property left in Louisiana by a man dying there is committed by the
Constitution of the United States and the people of Louisiana to the legislature of that State. Absent
a specific constitutional guarantee, it is for that legislature, not the life-tenured judges of this Court,
to select from among possible laws.").
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to be preserved in the domestic sphere." This narrowly defined role for the
federal government serves as a limit on state constitutional authority and as a
further guarantee of liberty.72
III. CURRENT STATE OF MARRIAGE AND FEDERALISM IN FAMILY LAW
A.

Legal Developments After Lewin and Brause

As courts in Hawai'i and Alaska were following their own constitutional
processes in applying strict scrutiny to their marriage statutes, 73 there was
increasing uncertainty about whether the Full Faith and Credit Clause 74 in

71. Dailey, supra note 48, at 1881. For example, the U.S. Supreme Court found that state
restrictions on interracial marriage were a violation of individual rights under the Equal Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. See Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967) ("There can be
no doubt that restricting the freedom to marry solely because of racial classifications violates the
central meaning of the Equal Protection Clause.").
72. Dailey, supra note 48, at 1880.
73. See supra notes 10, 19 and accompanying text. The Hawai'i Supreme Court in Lewin found
that the state's traditional marriage statute was subject to strict scrutiny for purposes of equal
protection because it created a sex-based classification. Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44, 67 (Haw.
1993). The Hawai'i Supreme Court remanded the case to a lower court for a determination of
whether the statute met the strict scrutiny standard. Id. at 68. Voters, however, ratified a state
constitutional amendment giving the state legislature the power to limit marriage to opposite-couples
before the Hawai'i Supreme Court was able to hear the case again for final adjudication. Coolidge,
supra note 3, at 20, 95-102. Similarly, in Brause, an Alaskan superior court judge found that
restrictions on same-sex marriage were subject to strict scrutiny as a violation of a state
constitutional right to privacy. Brause v. Bureau of Vital Statistics, No. 3AN-95-6562 CI, 1998 WL
88743, at *4-6 (Alaska Super. Ct. Feb. 27, 1998). Before the Alaska Supreme Court could decide
the issue, voters ratified a constitutional marriage amendment defining marriage as being between
one man and one woman. See Lobsinger,supra note 22, at 122.
74. The Full Faith and Credit Clause states: "Full Faith and Credit shall be given in each State to
the public Acts, Records, and judicial Proceedings of every other State. And the Congress may by
general Laws prescribe the Manner in which such Acts, Records and Proceedings shall be proved,
and the Effect thereof." U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1. The first sentence of the Full Faith and Credit
Clause has been interpreted narrowly by the U.S. Supreme Court and, thus, imposes only a minor set
of constraints on the states in terms of their power to apply choice-of-law rules to disputes in state
courts. Ralph U. Whitten, The Original Understandingof the Full Faith and Credit Clause and the
Defense of MarriageAct, 32 CREIGHTON L. REV. 255, 261 (1998). In Allstate Insurance Co. v.
Hague, 449 U.S. 302, 312-13 (1981), the Supreme Court set forth the test to determine whether a
state could constitutionally apply its own law to a dispute, rather than the law of another state under
the Full Faith and Credit Clause. States can constitutionally apply their own substantive law to a
dispute if the state can establish sufficient contact or aggregation of contacts to the parties or
transaction such that the application of its own law would not be arbitrary or fundamentally unfair.
Id. The second sentence of the Full Faith and Credit Clause, also known as the Effects Clause, gives
Congress the power to determine the substantive effect that state statutes will have on the laws of
other states. Whitten, supra, at 255, 262. This congressional power, however, raises questions about
whether Congress can prescribe a substantive effect for state statutes that exceeds the constitutional
choice-of-law rules defined by the Supreme Court under the first sentence of the Full Faith and
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the U.S. Constitution would require other states in the Union to recognize
same-sex marriages performed in a sister state. Some states responded by
passing statutes explicitly prohibiting the recognition of same-sex marriages,
even if the marriages were valid in other jurisdictions. On a federal level,
Congress also passed the Defense of Marriage Act in an effort to protect
states from having to recognize same-sex marriages performed in a sister
state. Finally, after November 1998, the people of various states began

Credit Clause. Id. at 262.
75. See, e.g., Deborah M. Henson, Will Same-Sex Marriages Be Recognized in Sister States?:
Full Faith and Credit and Due Process Limitations on States' Choice of Law Regarding the Status
and Incidents of Homosexual MarriagesFollowing Hawaii's Baehr v. Lewin, 32 U. LOUISVILLE J.
FAM. L. 551 (1994). The sufficient contacts test from Allstate allowed states to adopt their own
choice-of-law doctrine with respect to marriage. Id. at 560. At the time, however, the Restatement
(Second) of Conflict of Laws indicated that out-of-state marriages should be recognized in other
states so long as the marriage did not conflict with "the strong public policy of another state which
had the most significant relationship to the spouses and the marriage at the time of the marriage."
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 283(2) (1971). This public policy exception, as
articulated in the Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws, had previously been used to deny
recognition to marriages that involved incest, polygamy, minors, and the mentally incompetent.
Scott Ruskay-Kidd, The Defense of MarriageAct and the Overextension of CongressionalAuthority,
97 COLUM. L. REv. 1435, 1439 (1997). With Hawai'i on the verge of recognizing same-sex
marriage, there were questions raised about whether this public policy exception applied to
marriages between two parties of the same sex. See Henson, supra, at 555-56, 560-62.
Additionally, the Supreme Court had not specifically addressed whether the Full Faith and Credit
Clause applied to state recognition of marriage, and there was concern that choice-of-law rules might
change if Hawai'i and other states began recognizing same-sex marriage. See Ruskay-Kidd, supra,
at 1449.
76. See Lynn D. Wardle, Williams v. North Carolina, Divorce Recognition, and Same-Sex
Marriage Recognition, 32 CREIGHTON L. REv. 187, 239 app.II (1998) (listing statutes in twentyeight states that were passed from 1995 to 1998 to explicitly prohibit the recognition of same-sex
marriages).
77. George W. Dent, Jr., The Defense of TraditionalMarriage, 15 J.L. & POL. 581, 583 (1999).
The Defense of Marriage Act ("DOMA") has the operative effect of declaring that marriages are the
equivalent of licenses and not judgments. See Ruskay-Kidd, supranote 75, at 1439-40. Thus, state
recognition of marriage is not subject to the Full Faith and Credit Clause. See id. The text of
DOMA states:
No State, territory, or possession of the United States, or Indian tribe, shall be required to
give effect to any public act, record, or judicial proceeding of any other State, territory,
possession, or tribe respecting a relationship between persons of the same sex that is
treated as a marriage under the laws of such other State, territory, possession, or tribe, or
a right or claim arising from such relationship.
28 U.S.C. § 1738C (1996). Section three of DOMA also states:
In determining the meaning of any Act of Congress, or of any ruling, regulation, or
interpretation of the various administrative bureaus and agencies of the United States, the
word "marriage" means only a legal union between one man and one woman as husband
and wife, and the word "spouse" refers only to a person of the opposite sex who is a
husband or a wife.
I U.S.C. § 7 (2000). Some critics of section three of DOMA argue that this provision is an
unprecedented encroachment into an area of law that has traditionally been exclusively the concern
of the states. See, e.g., Evan Wolfson & Michael F. Melcher, Constitutionaland Legal Defects in
the "Defense of Marriage" Act, 16 QUINNIPIAC L. REv. 221, 221, 231 (1999). Another critic cites
section three of DOMA to draw attention to a growing body of federal family law and challenge the
traditional understanding of family law as an exclusively local concern. Hasday, supra note 55, at
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1302, 1373-82. In Massachusettsv. US. Department of Health & Human Services, 698 F. Supp. 2d
234, 249 (D. Mass. 2010), the District Court of Massachusetts even declared that DOMA was a
violation of the Tenth Amendment because "DOMA plainly intrudes on a core area of state
sovereignty-the ability [of states] to define the marital status of its citizens." According to the
district court, however, a challenge to a federal statute under the Tenth Amendment cannot prevail
without the following three elements: "(1) the statute must regulate the States as States, (2) it must
concern attributes of state sovereignty, and (3) it must be of such a nature that compliance with it
would impair a state's ability to structure integral operations in areas of traditional governmental
functions." Id. (quoting United States v. Bongiorno, 106 F.3d 1027, 1033 (1st Cir. 1997)). When
assessing DOMA under the first prong of the test, the District Court of Massachusetts cited evidence
related to the economic burden that DOMA places on Massachusetts's bottom line in order to
demonstrate that DOMA regulates the "States as States." Id. The origin of this requirement under
the first prong of the Bongiorno test can be traced back to the Supreme Court's decision in National
League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976), overruled by Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan
TransitAuthority, 469 U.S. 528 (1985). In Usery, the "States as States" concept developed out of a
factual scenario where the federal government, under the Commerce Clause, extended the minimum
wage and maximum hour provisions of the Fair Labor Standards Act ("FLSA") of 1938 to cover all
state and municipal employees. 425 U.S. at 835, 842. Accordingly, the Court found that "Congress
may not exercise. . . [the Commerce Clause] power so as to force directly upon the States its choices
as to how essential decisions regarding the conduct of integral governmental functions are to be
made." Id. at 855. In light of this background on the "States as States" requirement, it seems
surprising that the District Court of Massachusetts would simply use evidence of an economic
burden on the Commonwealth of Massachusetts to demonstrate that "the Commonwealth easily
satisfies the first requirement of a successful Tenth Amendment challenge." U.S. Dep't ofHealth &
Human Servs., 698 F. Supp. 2d at 249. By way of counterargument, Garcia'srejection of an
"integral" or "traditional" function test, in exempting states from federal regulation under the
Commerce Clause, might be construed as impliedly precluding the first and third prongs under the
Bongiorno test. See infra note 97 and accompanying text. The district court's analysis under the
second prong of state sovereignty, however, is equally as questionable because the court
misunderstands the extent of state sovereignty in the area of family law, see U.S. Dep't of Health &
Human Servs., 698 F. Supp. 2d at 249-51, and fails to appreciate the consequences of the fact that
section three of DOMA only defines marriage for federal purposes, see Dent, supra, at 583. With
the prospect that Hawai'i would soon recognize same-sex marriage, see supra notes 8-11 and
accompanying text, the federal government was faced with an administrative challenge, within its
own sphere of sovereignty, similar to the one it had previously faced when dealing with the issue of
common law marriage, see supra note 47 and accompanying text. Up to this point, the federal
government relied heavily on state marriage laws to determine marital status for social benefit
programs, such as social security claims. See supra note 47 and accompanying text. With the
uncertain state of marriage law in Hawai'i, the federal government passed DOMA to define marriage
for its own administrative purposes. See I U.S.C. § 7 (2000). Additionally, DOMA was written
using broad language so as not to interfere with the states' ability to regulate the pronouncements of
marriage. Nancy J. Feather, Defense of MarriageActs: An Analysis UnderState ConstitutionalLaw,
70 TEMP. L. REv. 1017, 1032 (1997). This conception of DOMA is, thus, consistent with the
widely-accepted interpretation of the domestic relations exception to federal court jurisdiction, in
that the states have exclusive authority to regulate the core domain of family law-pronouncements
of marriage, divorce, alimony, and child custody. See supra note 61 and accompanying text. By
contrast, DOMA gives the federal government the power to regulate claims regarding the
enforcement of such pronouncements with respect to federal benefit programs, thereby still
respecting the principle that marriage should generally be defined by local societal norms. See I
U.S.C. § 7 (2000); see also supra note 61 and accompanying text. As a result of these distinctions,
DOMA cannot be characterized as constituting a national marriage law in the same way as
overturning Proposition 8 would be because the latter constitutes a direct encroachment into the
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ratifying state constitutional marriage amendments because they viewed the
Currently, the
traditional definition of marriage as being in jeopardy.
number of states that have adopted constitutional marriage amendments has
grown to a total of twenty-nine state jurisdictions, including the 2008
amendments adopted in California, Florida, and Arizona.
In 2003, one of the states that did not ratify a state constitutional
marriage amendment, Massachusetts, became the first state to legally
recognize same-sex marriage.so The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court
found that restricting marriage to one man and one woman was not

states' ability to regulate the pronouncements of marriage-the core domain of family law. See
supra notes 48, 61 and accompanying text. In Gill v. Office ofPersonnel Management, 699 F. Supp.
2d 374, 393 (D. Mass. 2010) (emphasis in original), a companion case to U.S. Department of Health
& Human Services, the District Court of Massachusetts noted that DOMA "was, in fact, a significant
departure from the status quo at the federal level." Unlike the court's characterization in Gill,
however, a "significant departure" in the law is not inherently unconstitutional. A "significant
departure" can be constitutional as long as the governmental body enacting the change in law has the
power to do so under the U.S. Constitution, and the change does not amount to an individual rights
violation. See supra notes 4, 5 and accompanying text. As mentioned previously, the U.S.
Constitution explicitly grants Congress exclusive authority on matters of taxation, immigration, and
bankruptcy. See supra note 48. In Helvering v. Davis, 301 U.S. 619, 640-41, 645 (1937), the
Supreme Court has also held that Social Security legislation is constitutional under congressional
taxing and spending powers. Later, the federal benefit programs of Medicare and Medicaid were
enacted as the Social Security Amendments of 1960. Phyllis E. Bernard, Social Security and
Medicare Adjudications at HHS: Two Approaches to Administration Justice in an Ever-Expanding
Bureaucracy, 3 HEALTH MATRIX 339, 384 (1993). Thus, Congress should have the power under the
U.S. Constitution to determine the appropriate method of distributing federal benefits relating to
marriage in the areas of federal taxation, immigration, bankruptcy, Social Security, Medicare, and
Medicaid. Moreover, section three of DOMA defines marriage as "a legal union between one man
and one woman as husband and wife," 1 U.S.C. § 7 (2000), which is strikingly similar to Proposition
8's language that "[o]nly marriage between a man and a woman is valid or recognized in
California," CAL. CONST. art. I, § 7.5. Thus, it would be difficult to characterize section three of
DOMA as constituting an individual rights violation if California's enactment of Proposition 8 is not
also an individual rights violation, and as explained later in this comment, Proposition 8 does not
violate the U.S. Constitution on equal protection or due process grounds. See supra notes 111-201
and accompanying text.
78. Lynn D. Wardle, State MarriageAmendments: Developments, Precedents, and Significance,
7 FLA. COASTAL L. REv. 403, 403-05 (2005). Without DOMA, state courts would be responsible
for deciding whether there was a strong enough public policy exception in making choice-of-law
decisions with respect to recognition of out-of-state same-sex marriages. See Ruskay-Kidd, supra
note 75, at 1440. Some state courts may have decided to give recognition to out-of-state same-sex
marriages out of respect for the principle that sister state decisions should be given full credit. Id.
As a result, states began passing state statutes and constitutional marriage amendments to codify
public policy with respect to recognition of out-of-state same-sex marriages. See id. at 1446.
79. Kimberly N. Chehardy, Conflicting Approaches: Legalizing Same-Sex Marriage Through
Conflicts ofLaw, 8 CONN. PUB. INT. L.J. 131, 148, 159 n.193 (2009). While this figure includes the
ratification of Proposition 8 in California, see CAL. CONST. art. I, § 7.5, it does not include the
Hawai'i marriage amendment, which merely gives the Hawai'i state legislature the power to restrict
marriage to opposite-sex couples, RAW. CONST. art. I, § 23.
80. See Lois A. Weithorn, Can a Subsequent Change in Law Void a Marriage that Was Valid at
Its Inception?: Considering the Legal Effect of Proposition 8 on California's Existing Same-Sex
Marriages,60 HASTINGS L.J. 1063, 1074 (2009).
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rationally related to a legitimate state interest for purposes of state equal
protection and due process requirements.8 2 As a result, the court did not
decide the issue of whether sexual orientation was a suspect or quasi-suspect
class.83 Instead, the court simply defined marriage as "the voluntary union
of two persons as spouses, to the exclusion of all others."84
Subsequently, in 2008, California and Connecticut became the second
and third states, respectively, to legalize same-sex marriage.85 The
California and Connecticut state supreme court decisions, which addressed
the legalization of same sex-marriage, were unique in that both states had
already granted all the legal rights and responsibilities of marriage, available
at the state level, to same-sex couples through domestic partnerships or civil
unions. Additionally, these two decisions were the first cases where a final
81. Courts generally find that a statute is constitutional under the rational basis standard, which
was applied by the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court, because courts traditionally treat
challenged legislation with a presumed level of deference under this standard. Gayle Lynn Pettinga,
Rational Basis with Bite: Intermediate Scrutiny by Any Other Name, 62 IND. L.J. 779, 783 (1987).
Traditionally, the government only needs to provide a plausible set of facts to justify the challenged
statute. Id. Even in instances where the government cannot provide a plausible set of facts, courts
will supplant their own justification for the statute or re-characterize its purpose to render the statute
rationally related to a legitimate state interest. Id. In recent cases, however, courts have begun to
afford less deference to legislation under rational basis review, which leads some scholars to
characterize this new standard as rational basis with bite. See Wadhwani, supra note 9, at 806-07.
82. Goodridge v. Dep't of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 961 (Mass. 2003). The Massachusetts
Supreme Judicial Court rejected the argument that traditional marriage advances the state's interest
in procreation because same-sex couples can procreate through artificial insemination and a number
of opposite-sex couples get married without any desire to have children. Id. at 961-62.
Additionally, the court rejected the argument that traditional marriage serves the purpose of placing
children in an optimal living environment by noting demographic changes that have led to the
breakdown of the traditional family in society. Id. at 962-63. Finally, the court rejected the
argument that traditional marriage conserves scarce state resources, on the theory that same-sex
couples are more financially independent of each other than opposite-sex couples, because same-sex
couples could make use of marital benefits to care for children or other dependents. Id. at 964.
Some legal scholars have criticized the results-oriented rationale in Goodridge. See, e.g., Jamal
Greene, Divorcing Marriagefrom Procreation, 114 YALE L.J. 1989, 1989 (2005). The marriage
statute in Goodridgeonly needed to be rationally related to one of the above goals in order for it to
meet the rational basis standard. Id. at 1991. Even if traditional marriage is both under-inclusive
and over-inclusive for purposes of the state's interest in advancing procreation, the rational basis
standard allows the state to draw arbitrary boundaries in furthering its interests. Id. at 1991 n.15.
Thus, traditional marriage statutes cannot fail unless some form of heightened scrutiny is applied.
Id. at 1991.
83. Goodridge, 798 N.E.2d at 961.
84. Id. at 969.
85. See Weithorn, supranote 80, at 1074-75.
86. Bennett Klein & Daniel Redman, From Separate to Equal: Litigating MarriageEquality in a
Civil Union State, 41 CoNN. L. REv. 1381, 1383, 1383 n.2 (2009). Connecticut's civil union law
was actually passed after the Connecticut case was filed, but the civil union law was a contextual
feature of the litigation. Id. at 1383. Additionally, the California Supreme Court issued its In re
Marriage Cases decision before Connecticut legalized same-sex marriage in Kerrigan v.
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appellate court applied heightened scrutiny to a state marriage statute. 87
Given the nature of domestic partnership and civil union laws in California
and Connecticut,"8 both decisions held that a separate legal framework for
same-sex couples with only a difference in nomenclature was still sufficient
to constitute a constitutional violation." Currently, the Connecticut decision
still stands as valid law, but the specific holding of the California decision
has been superseded by a constitutional amendment which provides that
"[o]nly marriage between a man and a woman is valid or recognized in
California."90
After the passage of Proposition 8, there have been a number of legal
developments on the issue of marriage.9' First, in a unanimous 2009
decision, the Supreme Court of Iowa legalized same-sex marriage and
resoundingly rejected a civil union alternative.92 Second, Vermont, New

Commissioner ofPublic Health, 957 A.2d 407 (Conn. 2008). See Weithom, supra note 80, at 107475. However, the California case was actually litigated after Kerrigan while a ruling from the
Connecticut Supreme Court was pending. Klein & Redman, supra, at 1383 n.2.
87. See Klein & Redman, supra note 86, at 1383 n.I. The California Supreme Court found that
the privacy and due process provisions of the California Constitution provide individuals with a
fundamental right "to establish a legally recognized family with the person of one's choice." In re
Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d 384, 423, 429 (Cal. 2008). After considering a number of factors, the
court also held that sexual orientation is a suspect class for equal protection purposes because it
found that sexual orientation is an integral part of a person's identity. Id. at 442-43. As a result, the
court ruled that differential treatment on the basis of sexual orientation is inappropriate and, thus,
applied strict scrutiny to California's traditional marriage statute. See id. at 442-43, 447. The
Connecticut Supreme Court, however, held that sexual orientation was a quasi-suspect class for
equal protection purposes because it found that sexual orientation is an essential aspect of
personhood. See Kerrigan, 957 A.2d at 431-32. The Connecticut court also found that there has
been a history of discrimination against gays and lesbians in the United States and, thus, applied
intermediate scrutiny to Connecticut's marriage statute. See id. at 432-34, 476.
88. See supra note 86 and accompanying text.
89. See Chehardy, supra note 79, at 305-06. The California Supreme Court held that restricting
the designation of marriage to opposite-sex couples violated the California Constitution on equal
protection grounds. In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d at 452. Thus, the court found that either the
designation of marriage should be withheld from opposite-sex couples, or the same designation
should be extended to same-sex couples. See id. at 452-53. Given the long history of using the
designation of marriage in society, the court ruled that extending marriage to same-sex couples
would be the remedy that is more consistent with the probable intent of voters who passed
Proposition 22. Id. at 453. Similarly, the Connecticut Supreme Court found that restricting the
designation of marriage to opposite-sex couples created a legally cognizable injury to same-sex
couples. See Kerrigan, 957 A.2d at 416-20. The court came to this conclusion even though, at the
time, Connecticut had a civil union law that provided all the legal rights and obligations of marriage,
available at the state level, to same-sex couples. See id.
90. See Marc R. Poirier, Name Calling: Identifying Stigma in the "Civil Union"/"Marriage"
Distinction,41 CONN. L. REV. 1425, 1427-33 (2009); CAL. CONST. art. I, § 7.5.
91. See infra notes 92-96 and accompanying text.
92. Vamum v. Brien, 763 N.W.2d 862, 906-07 (Iowa 2009). The Supreme Court of Iowa found
that Iowa Code section 595.2 (2001), which stated that "[olnly marriage between a male and a
female is valid," violated the state constitution on equal protection grounds. Id. at 907. In analyzing
the state statute, the court determined that state legislation based on sexual orientation, at a
minimum, was subject to an intermediate level of scrutiny, which requires that the statute be
substantially related to an important governmental interest. Id. at 896-97. The court then
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Hampshire, and the District of Columbia legalized same-sex marriage in
2009 through the legislative process. 93 Third, the California Supreme Court
ruled that Proposition 8 reversed the specific holding of In re Marriage
Cases with respect to the designation of marriage, while recognizing as
legally valid the estimated 18,000 same-sex marriages that were performed
prior to the passage of Proposition 8. Finally, the U.S. District Court for
the Northern District of California declared that Proposition 8 was a
violation of both the Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses of the
Fourteenth Amendment," and that decision was appealed to the U.S. Court
determined that the state marriage statute did not substantially further any of the government's
proffered objectives and, thus, concluded that the statute was unconstitutional. Id. at 904, 906. As a
remedy of this violation, the court also rejected "parallel civil institutions for same-sex couples"
because it noted that these institutions would equally violate equal protection principles. Id. at 906.
Although the Iowa Supreme Court borrowed from federal constitutional principles in analyzing
Iowa's guarantee of equal protection, the court explained that it has "jealously guarded (its] right to
'employ a different analytical framework' under the state equal protection clause as well as to
independently apply the federally formulated principles." Id. at 878 n.6 (quoting Racing Ass'n of
Cent. Iowa v. Fitzgerald, 675 N.W.2d 1, 4-7 (Iowa 2004)). Moreover, the Iowa Supreme Court
explicitly stated that Varnum did "not implicate federal constitutional protections." Id. at 878 n.6.
In fact, it is important to note that the U.S. Supreme Court currently uses the rational basis test when
applying equal protection principles to classifications based on sexual orientation. See infra notes
121, 142 and accompanying text.
93. See Poirier,supra note 90. at 1430-31, 1431 n.22; Ian Urbina, District of Columbia Backs
Same-Sex Marriage, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 16, 2009, at A28, available at 2009 WLNR 25290319. The
state legislatures of New York and New Jersey seriously considered similar enactments, but in the
end, neither state legislature was able to muster enough votes to legalize same-sex marriage in their
respective states. Jeremy W. Peters, New York Senate Turns Back Bill on Gay Marriage, N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 3, 2009, at Al, available at 2009 WLNR 24363436; David Kocieniewski, New Jersey
Senate Defeats Same-Sex MarriageBill, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 8, 2010, at Al8, available at 2010 WLNR
386658.
94. Strauss v. Horton, 207 P.3d 48, 75-76, 121-22 (Cal. 2009). The specific holding of In re
Marriage Cases was that same-sex couples were entitled to the designation of marriage. In re
MarriageCases, 183 P.3d at 453, superseded by, CAL. CONST. art. I, § 7.5, as recognized in Strauss,
207 P.3d at 75-76. According to the court in Strauss, however, Proposition 8 did not overturn samesex couples' right under the privacy and due process provisions of the California Constitution to
form their own protected family relationships because Proposition 8 merely carved out a limited
exception to the preexisting scope of these constitutional provisions as recognized in In re Marriage
Cases. Strauss, 207 P.3d at 74-76. Moreover, Proposition 8 did not overrule the notion that sexual
orientation is a suspect class under California law. Id. at 78. According to the court, strict scrutiny
should still be applied in all other contexts except for the designation of marriage. Id.
95. Perry v. Schwarzznegger, 704 F. Supp. 2d 921, 1003-04 (N.D. Cal. 2010). The district court
cited Supreme Court precedent as evidence that "[tihe freedom to marry is recognized as a
fundamental right protected by the Due Process Clause." Id. at 991. In making this assertion,
however, the court focused on cases that did not involve the fundamental right of same-sex couples
to marry and that relied heavily on the holding of Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967), which stood
for the principle that individuals had a fundamental right to marry in the interracial context. See
Perry, 704 F. Supp. 2d at 991-92 (citing Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 95 (1987); Zablocki v.
Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 384 (1978); Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632, 639-40
(1974); and Loving, 388 U.S. at 12); see also infra note 186 and accompanying text. The court noted
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of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.96
B.

The Decline and Modest Revival ofFederalism in Family Law

Long before various states began recognizing same-sex marriage, the
import and significance of federalism began to erode. Moreover, federalist
principles were applied inconsistently over time, which had a corresponding
effect on federalism's influence in the area of family law.97 The Court under

that the question presented "is whether plaintiffs seek to exercise the fundamental right to marry; or,
because they are couples of the same sex, whether they seek recognition of a new right." Perry, 704
F. Supp. 2d at 992. To decide this question under the Due Process Clause, as required by
Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 710 (1997), the court examined the history and practice of
marriage and found certain common characteristics of marriage throughout U.S. legal tradition.
Perry, 704 F. Supp. 2d at 992-93. Despite the fact that the dominant conception of marriage
throughout U.S. legal history has been as a union between a man and a woman, see supra notes 4043 and accompanying text, the court glossed over this fact "as an artifact ... of a [former] time,"
Perry, 704 F. Supp. 2d at 993, and did not address the reality that forty-five states in the United
States currently recognize marriage in a traditional fashion, see infra note 204 and accompanying
text. Furthermore, the opinion did not mention the Supreme Court's reasoning in Glucksberg where
the Court was hesitant "to expand the concept of substantive due process because guideposts for
responsible decisionmaking in this unchartered area are scarce and open-ended." Glucksberg, 521
U.S. at 720 (quoting Collins v. City of Harker Heights, 503 U.S. 115, 125 (1992)). Under the equal
protection analysis, the court determined that strict scrutiny is the appropriate standard for all
classifications based on sexual orientation, Perry, 704 F. Supp. 2d at 997, despite the Supreme
Court's application of the rational basis standard in Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 632 (1996). The
opinion virtually conceded this point by subsequently explaining why Proposition 8 fails even the
rational basis standard. See Perry, 704 F. Supp. 2d at 997-98. This conclusion stands out in direct
contrast to the prevailing sentiment as expressed in Romer because Proposition 8 is much more
limited in scope than Colorado's Amendment 2. See infra notes 117-43 and accompanying text.
Thus, Proposition 8 cannot be similarly characterized as being the product of bare animus against
gay and lesbian individuals and should pass constitutional muster under the rational basis standard.
See infra notes 117-43 and accompanying text.
96. See The Associated Press, California: State Officials Seek Resumption of Same-Sex
Marriages,N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 7, 2010, at Al0, available at 2010 WLNR 15728701.
97. See Wardle, supra note 48, at 221. During the New Deal era, the U.S. Supreme Court began
showing a high degree of deference to Congress at the expense of certain substantive limits on
federal power. See Nelson & Pushaw, supra note 49, at 63. In United States v. Darby, 312 U.S.
100, 123-26 (1941), the Supreme Court upheld the FLSA of 1938 while also referring to the Tenth
Amendment as a mere "truism" that did not impose meaningful limits on congressional action.
FLSA prohibited the introduction of goods into interstate commerce that were not produced
according to certain labor standards, including minimum wage and maximum hour requirements. Id.
at 109. In upholding FLSA, the Court invoked Marshall's interpretation of congressional power in
Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. 1 (1824) and McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316 (1819) to support its
holding that Congress could regulate noncommercial intrastate activity as long it has a substantial
effect on interstate commerce. Darby, 312 U.S. at 113-14, 118-20. This "substantial effects" test
was later retooled in Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942). There, the Court held that Congress
could regulate private production and consumption of wheat because the activity, when considered
in the aggregate, had a substantial effect on interstate commerce. Id. at 128-29; see also Nelson &
Pushaw, supra note 49, at 81 ("[Elven though consumption of wheat by individual farmers like
Filburn had a 'trivial' impact on [wheat] price[s], the aggregate of all such home consumption
significantly influenced wheat prices and hence substantially affected interstate commerce."). In its
final form, the test merely required a finding that Congress could have had some "rational basis" for
determining that the activity substantially affected interstate commerce. See Heart of Atlanta Motel,

182

[Vol. 38: 161, 2010]

Marriagein California
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW

Chief Justice William Rehnquist, however, initiated a modest revival of
federalism, which undergirded the long-standing principle that family law is
a matter of traditional state concern." In United States v. Lopez,99 the Court
struck down the Gun-Free School Zones Act in a decision that dramatically
reaffirmed the principle of federalism in family law.'oo There, Chief Justice

Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241, 258 (1964). This final version of the test essentially made it
possible for Congress to regulate any and all conduct, including domestic relations, because
everything can have a substantial effect on interstate commerce if Congress were to follow a causal
chain of attenuated events. Nelson & Pushaw, supra note 49, at 6. Additionally, the Tenth
Amendment was applied inconsistently in National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976)
and Garciav. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority, 469 U.S. 528 (1985). In Usery, the Court
asserted that the Tenth Amendment was significant, even if it was previously referred to as only a
"truism." Usery, 426 U.S. at 842-43, abrogatedby Garcia,469 U.S. at 556-57. According to the
Court, the Tenth Amendment precluded the federal government from regulating state employment
practices under FLSA because the "Amendment expressly declares the constitutional policy that
Congress may not exercise power in a fashion that impairs the States' integrity or their ability to
function effectively in a federal system." Id. at 843 (quoting Fry v. United States, 421 U.S. 542, 547
(1975)). This bold rejection of the Court's view of the Tenth Amendment in Darby, however, was
short-lived. See Garcia, 469 U.S. at 556-57. In Garcia, the issue was whether FLSA could be
applied to state operation of a public mass transit system in San Antonio, Texas. Id. at 531, 533.
The Court reasoned that it was futile to design any affirmative limits on congressional action under
the Commerce Clause and that the political process provided the appropriate safeguards for ensuring
the federalist balance between the national government and the states. Id. at 556. In so doing, the
Court affirmatively rejected an "integral" or "traditional" function test in exempting states from
federal regulation under the Commerce Clause. Id. at 546-47. Thus, the Court overruled Usery and
held that application of FLSA to state employment practices did not contravene a constitutional limit
on congressional power. Id. at 555-57.
98. Wardle, supra note 48, at 221.
99. 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
100. See Dailey, supra note 48, at 1789-90. Lopez did not directly take up the issue of federalism
in family law. Id. at 1789. Rather, the issue on appeal was whether Congress had the power under
the Commerce Clause to pass legislation that made it a federal offense to knowingly possess a
firearm within a school zone. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 551-52. The reasoning in dicta from this case,
however, strongly affirmed the principle that issues of "marriage, divorce, and child custody" are
exclusively within the regulatory authority of the states and beyond the constitutional powers of the
federal government. See id. at 564. Even though Lopez was a 5-4 decision with a number of
concurring opinions, all of the justices were in agreement on the idea that the federal government did
not have the constitutional authority to regulate in the area of family law. See Dailey, supra note 48,
at 1789. For example, Justice Clarence Thomas opined that the Commerce Clause "can by no means
encompass authority over mere gun possession, any more than it empowers the Federal Government
to regulate marriage, littering, or cruelty to animals, throughout the 50 States." Lopez, 514 U.S. at
585 (Thomas, J., concurring). While Justice Stephen Breyer disputed the holding of the case, he still
affirmed the principle of federalism in family law because he asserted that declaring the statute
constitutional was not the equivalent of blurring the line between national and local concern or
holding that the federal government had the power to regulate the domain of family law. See id. at
624 (Breyer, J., dissenting). Finally, Justice Anthony Kennedy added another reason for holding the
federal statute constitutional. Id. at 583 (Kennedy, J., concurring). He argued that the statute would
deprive the states of an opportunity to perform needed experimentation in an area where the states
traditionally have a significant amount of expertise. Id. According to Kennedy, the statute had the
effect of displacing all the programs that states put in place for the prevention of guns in schools, and
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Rehnquist developed a test that subjected congressional action under the
Commerce Clause to heightened scrutiny if it regulated noncommercial
activity that was of traditional state concern.o'0 Furthermore, in United
States v. Morrison,o2 the Court struck down the Violence Against Women
Act ("VAWA") out of concern for federal encroachment in the area of
family law.10 3 According to the Court, Congress did not have the power
under the Commerce Clause to provide a federal civil remedy for victims of
gender-based violence because VAWA regulated conduct that has
traditionally been reserved as an area within the sovereign province of the
states.104

that as a result, all state efforts "to organize their governmental functions in a certain way" would
have to bend at the direction of the federal government in order to effectuate a unified policy. Id.
Even though the intrusion may seem minor in comparison to other examples, Kennedy explained
that it is nonetheless significant. Id.
101. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 559-61; see also Nelson & Pushaw, supra note 49, at 94-95 (describing
the rationale from Lopez as suggesting that "scrutiny should be increased if the Court determines that
a particular federal law regulates either 'noncommercial' activity or areas of 'traditional state
concern,' or both"). In Lopez, a high school student brought a concealed handgun to school and was
originally charged under a Texas state law that banned firearms on school premises. Lopez, 514 U.S.
at 551. The state law charges were later dropped, and the high school student was then charged with
violating the Gun-Free School Zones Act ("GFSZA"). Id. at 551. Upon conviction, the high school
student challenged the validity of GFSZA as exceeding the scope of congressional power under the
Commerce Clause. Id. at 552. The Court reasoned that GFSZA pertained to two areas of law that
were traditionally the concern of the states, education and crime, and that the statute was
noncommercial in nature. Id. at 561, 564. Additionally, GFSZA was not part of a larger framework
of legislation seeking to regulate interstate economic activity for which it might be essential to
regulate intrastate activity. Id. at 561. Thus, the Court held that the statute was not within the scope
of congressional power under the Commerce Clause. See id. at 567.
102. 529 U.S. 598 (2000).
103. See Wardle, supra note 48, at 241. Again, Morrison did not directly take up the issue of
federalism in family law on appeal, but the Court's reasoning in dicta reaffirmed the principles
espoused in Lopez. See id. at 241-42. Rather, the issue on appeal was whether the U.S. Constitution
granted Congress the power, under the Commerce Clause, to create a federal cause of action for
women that suffered gender-related assaults and violence. Id. at 241. The majority declared the
statute unconstitutional primarily because the justices believed that regulating domestic relations was
not within the constitutional authority of Congress. Id. The Court reasoned that if it upheld the
VAWA, there would be no way to distinguish future federal statutes that directly regulated family
life. See id.; see also Morrison, 529 U.S. at 599 (asserting in dicta that an attenuated causal chain
argument justifying the substantial effects of gender-related violence on interstate commerce would
"not limit Congress to regulating violence, but may be applied equally as well to family law and
other areas of state regulation since the aggregate effect of marriage, divorce, and childrearing on the
national economy is undoubtedly significant"). Unlike Lopez, however, where the entire Court
agreed on the principle of federalism in family law, the dissent took a much different approach in
Morrison. See Wardle, supra note 48, at 241-43. The dissent noted the interstate aspects of VAWA
and argued that the boundaries of local and national concern delineated by the Court were merely
illusory in a highly developed and technological age. Id. at 241-42. As a practical matter, according
to the dissent, any activity can be tied in some way to some form of interstate economic activity and,
thus, may be regulated by Congress under the substantial effects test associated with the Commerce
Clause. Id.
104. Morrison, 529 U.S. at 601, 617-18. In Morrison, a female student at Virginia Polytechnic
Institute ("Virginia Tech") alleged that she was beaten and raped by two male students who were
members of the varsity football team. Id. at 602. After an internal investigation and hearing, one of
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In Lopez and Morrison, the Court rejected the view that the Commerce
Clause could be construed as encompassing congressional authority to
regulate issues of traditional state concern, such as local crime and family
law.'0o Correspondingly, in light of Washington v. Glucksberg,'06 federal
courts would be wise to view the Fourteenth Amendment in a similar
fashion with respect to Proposition 8.107 The original purpose of the
the male students was suspended from the school for two semesters, but he successfully appealed the
decision and was able to return to school before completing the original suspension. Id. at 603. The
female student then dropped out of school and filed suit against Virginia Tech in federal district
court under VAWA. Id. at 601, 603-05. The Supreme Court relied on Lopez in concluding that
Congress did not have the power to pass VAWA because Congress could regulate areas such as
marriage, divorce, and childrearing if allowed to regulate noncommercial, intrastate criminal
activity. Id. at 615-17.
105. See supra notes 99-103 and accompanying text. Even though the Court strengthened the
affirmative limits on congressional action in Lopez and Morrison, the effect of these cases was
largely undercut by the Court's later holding in Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1 (2005). There, two
extremely ill women in California began ingesting locally grown marijuana, under the advisement of
their doctors, as a method of alleviating certain symptoms associated with their ongoing treatment.
Id. at 6-7. The State of Califomia passed the Compassionate Use Act of 1996 in order to provide
"seriously ill" patients with access to the benefits of medicinal marijuana use. Id. at 5-6. Medicinal
use of marijuana, however, still remained unlawful according to the federal Controlled Substances
Act. See id. at 7. The two women filed a federal lawsuit alleging that enforcing the federal law with
respect to them would result in a violation of the Commerce Clause. Id. at 8. The Supreme Court
held that the federal Act was within congressional authority under the Commerce Clause because
there was a rational basis for concluding that intrastate cultivation and use of marijuana, in the
aggregate, had a substantial effect on interstate commerce. Id. at 22. Additionally, the Court found
that the heightened scrutiny standard of Lopez and Morrison did not apply in Raich because the
regulation of intrastate use and cultivation of marijuana was part of a larger statutory framework
designed to curtail the interstate production and distribution of controlled substances. Id. at 23-26.
The Court reached this conclusion, however, even though the regulation was noneconomic and
related to intrastate criminal activity, which has traditionally been reserved as an area of state
regulation. Id. at 23-26, 29.
106. 521 U.S. 702 (1997).
107. Ironically, it was the judicial branch that was originally intended to serve as a check on the
expansion of the federal government's power into the realm of state sovereignty. See McCullouch v.
Maryland, 17 U.S. 316, 401 (1819). Lopez and Morrison, thus, addressed congressional intervention
in areas of traditional state concern, see supra notes 99-104 and accompanying text, which is
arguably distinguishable from possible federal court interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment to
include a new constitutional right that infringes on traditional state powers. Additionally, the
Court's holding in Raich poses the question of why dicta from Lopez and Morrison, with respect to
federalism in family law, should guide federal courts in their interpretation of the Fourteenth
Amendment. See supra note 105 and accompanying text. A potential answer lies in the Supreme
Court's discussion of the Fourteenth Amendment when considering a proposed right to physicianassisted suicide in Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702 (1997). There, four doctors, three
patients, and a non-profit organization brought a federal challenge to a state statute that prohibited
assisted suicide. Id. at 707-08. Washington Revised Code section 9A.36.060(1) (1994) provided
that "[a] person is guilty of promoting a suicide attempt when he knowingly causes or aids another
person to attempt suicide." Even though the State of Washington had always prohibited assisted
suicide, the plaintiffs argued that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment conferred a
right to die. Id. at 708-09. The district court agreed and also held that the statute violated the U.S.
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Fourteenth Amendment was to counteract the prejudicial treatment of racial
minorities through equal protection principles and not to effectively cede
regulatory authority to the federal government on issues of traditional state
concern. o With respect to Proposition 8, a number of jurists argue that
Constitution's Equal Protection Clause. Id. at 708. The Supreme Court, however, was more
reluctant than the district court "to expand the concept of substantive due process because guideposts
for responsible decisionmaking in this unchartered area are scarce and open-ended." Id. at 720
(quoting Collins v. City of Harker Heights, 503 U.S. 115, 125 (1992)). The Court expressed tangible
concern about recognizing a new constitutional right out of fear that the Due Process Clause would
become no more than an engine for implementing judicial policy preferences. Id. Similar restraint
marks the Supreme Court's "approach to the question[] whether an asserted substantive right is
entitled to heightened solicitude under the Equal Protection Clause . . . ." Moore v. City of East
Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 503 n.10 (1977) (plurality opinion). The Court also noted that history and
legal tradition demonstrated a long-standing prohibition on assisted suicide as an expression of this
country's commitment to the value and dignity of human life. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 710.
Moreover, "the structure and limitations of federalism ... [have traditionally] allow[ed] the States
great latitude under their police powers to legislate as to the protection of the lives, limbs, health,
comfort, and quiet of all persons." Gonzales v. Oregon, 546 U.S. 243, 270 (2006) (quoting
Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 475 (1996) (internal quotation marks omitted). As a result,
state regulation of medical practice, such as the practice of physician-assisted suicide, has been
recognized as an area traditionally encompassed by the states' police power. See id. at 271, 274. At
the time Glucksberg was decided, a number of states, including California, Oregon, Iowa, Rhode
Island, and New York, were "engaged in serious, thoughtful examinations of physician-assisted
suicide and other similar issues," and the Court was unwilling to cut off public debate in this arena.
Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 717-20. Although many states, excluding Oregon, were simply reaffirming
bans on physician-assisted suicide, some states were developing alternative methods of addressing
the underlying problem. Id. at 716-17. Modem medicine and technology made it more likely for
Americans to remain in an unhealthy state in institutions as a result of chronic illness. Id. at 716. In
response, states began permitting "'living wills,' surrogate health-care decisionmaking, and the
withdrawal or refusal of life-sustaining medical treatment" as alternatives to assisted suicide. Id.
Glucksberg is analogous to the current scenario with respect to Proposition 8. As in Glucksberg,
where history and legal tradition supported a long-standing commitment to and respect for human
life, id. at 710, the dominant conception of marriage in this country's jurisprudence has been as a
union between a man and a woman, see supra notes 40-43 and accompanying text. When
Glucksberg was decided, a number of states were engaged in a debate over the legal recognition of
assisted suicide, which produced alternative solutions on an issue of traditional state concern.
Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 716-19. Similarly, there are a number of states that are currently
developing alternative solutions with respect to same-sex marriage, such as civil unions and
domestic partnerships, as a result of debate on this family law issue, which is also one of local
concern. See supra notes 73-94 and accompanying text. Thus, in light of Glucksberg and when
considering newly proposed rights under the Fourteenth Amendment, see Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at
720, it would be wise to give greater weight to certain background principles of federalism in the
Constitution, and in Supreme Court precedent, that promote liberty and eschew tyranny through an
appropriate relationship between the federal government and the states, see supra notes 48-72 and
accompanying text.
108. See Wardle, supra note 48, at 234-36. The Fourteenth Amendment was part of a series of
Reconstruction Amendments to the U.S. Constitution after the Civil War. Id. at 234-35. These
amendments did not directly address the issue of federalism in family law, but they did grant
increased power to Congress to pass legislation designed to effectuate the purposes of the Thirteenth,
Fourteenth, and Fifteenth Amendments. Id. Additionally, the Thirteenth Amendment abolished
slavery, which was considered a domestic relations matter in the United States. Id. at 235. In this
manner, the Reconstruction Amendments can be viewed as affecting state sovereignty over domestic
relations because their purpose was to completely destroy slavery in the states. Id. The focus on
slavery, however, demonstrates that this change was intended to be very specific, and it was not
meant to affect state sovereignty in regulating other areas of family law. Id.
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defining marriage between a man and a woman is a violation of equal
protection or due process rights guaranteed under the Fourteenth
Amendment to the U.S. Constitution.' 09 The remainder of this comment will
address those arguments by examining U.S. Supreme Court precedent and
comparing the facts and legal principles of those cases to the factual context
of the Proposition 8 scenario."o
IV. EXAMINING FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT PRECEDENT
The Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution provides that no
state shall "deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due
process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal
protection of the laws.""' The U.S. Supreme Court has previously
interpreted the Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses in the context of a
state constitutional amendment in Colorado, which denied protection against
same-sex discrimination, 112 a state statute criminalizing sodomy in Texas,H3
and a state ban on interracial marriage in Virginia.1 14 These cases are often
cited as precedent to support the proposition that there is a right under the
U.S. Constitution to same-sex marriage."t5 The subsequent discussion will
109. See, e.g., Richard M. Lombino, II, Gay Marriage:Equality Matters, 14 S. CAL. REV. L. &
WOMEN'S STUD. 3, 23 (2004) ("Marriage is a fundamental, civil and moral right of all Americans. It
is guaranteed by the Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment to the
Constitution.").
110. See infra notes 111-201 and accompanying text.
111. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
112. Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996). The U.S. Supreme Court struck down Amendment 2,
which was a state constitutional amendment in Colorado that prevented the government from
protecting gay and lesbian individuals from discrimination, because it violated the U.S. Constitution
on equal protection grounds. See id. at 624, 635-36. An Equal Protection claim requires a showing
of invidious discrimination against a particular social group. Collis, supra note 9, at 993.
Additionally, the court must decide which standard of review to apply in the particular case at hand.
Id. The court will assume the lowest standard of review, and determine whether the law is rationally
related to a legitimate state interest, unless the law infringes on a fundamental right or targets a
suspect class. Id. Only if one of these conditions is met can the court apply some form of
heightened scrutiny. Id. This comment's examination of Romer, however, will not discuss invidious
discrimination or the appropriate standard of review at length because this comment argues that
current precedent does not support a finding that there is an individual right to same-sex marriage.
See infra notes 117-43 and accompanying text. Any interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment
that includes such a right in the Proposition 8 context would have greater consequences to the liberty
interest in the Due Process Clause because of federal encroachment into an area of traditional state
concern. See infra notes 175-79 and accompanying text. The U.S. Supreme Court has held that the
Fourteenth Amendment applies not only to the states but also to the federal government through the
Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause. Collis, supra note 9, at 992-93.
113. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
114. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
115. See, e.g., Toni Lester, Adam and Steve vs. Adam and Eve: Will the New Supreme Court
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show, however, that all three of these cases are distinguishable on their
merits and do not support a finding that state constitutional marriage
amendments violate either the Equal Protection or Due Process Clauses of
the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution." 6

Grant Gays the Right to Marry?, 14 Am. U. J. GENDER Soc. POL'Y & L. 253, 279-98 (citing Romer,
Lawrence, and Loving as a potential avenue for "gay rights advocates to lay claim to the Fourteenth
Amendment's promises, especially in the area of marriage rights").
116. See infra notes 117-201 and accompanying text. As demonstrated by Romer, Lawrence, and
Loving, this comment does not argue that all state regulation in the area of family law, or all laws
relating to classifications based on sexual orientation, should be consistent with individual rights as
found in the U.S. Constitution. This comment simply argues that existing precedent does not
support a finding that traditional marriage laws are a violation of individual rights. See infra notes
117-201 and accompanying text. For example, in Citizens for Equal Protection v. Bruning, 455
F.3d 859, 868-69 (2006), the Eighth Circuit rejected arguments that a state constitutional marriage
amendment in Nebraska violated the U.S. Constitution's Equal Protection Clause. Nebraska voters
unequivocally ratified a constitutional marriage amendment in November 2000, which was codified
as Article I, section 29 of the Nebraska Constitution and provided that: "Only marriage between a
man and a woman shall be valid or recognized in Nebraska. The uniting of two persons of the same
sex in a civil union, domestic partnership, or other similar same-sex relationship shall not be valid or
recognized in Nebraska." Citizensfor EqualProtection, 455 F.3d at 863. The Eighth Circuit found
that the State that Nebraska's enactment of section 29 of its constitution was "rationally related to
the govemment interest in steering procreation into marriage," and rejected the conclusion that that
Romer controlled the outcome of the case. Id. at 867-68. The court held:
We likewise reject the district court's conclusion that the Colorado enactment at issue in
Romer is indistinguishable from § 29. The Colorado enactment repealed all existing and
barred all future preferential policies based on "orientation, conduct, practices, or
relationships." The Supreme Court struck it down based upon this "unprecedented"
scope. Here, § 29 limits the class of people who may validly enter into marriage and the
legal equivalents to marriage emerging in other States-civil unions and domestic
partnerships. This focus is not so broad as to render Nebraska's reasons for its enactment
"inexplicable by anything but animus" towards same-sex couples.
Id. at 868 (citations omitted.). The Eighth Circuit also discussed the appropriateness of recognizing
a new constitutional right over the will of a democratic majority. Id. at 871. The court stated:
Constitutional rights are, after all, rights against the democratic majority. But public
opinion is not irrelevant to the task of deciding whether a constitutional right exists....
If it is truly a new right, as a right to same-sex marriage would be ... [sic] [judges] will
have to go beyond the technical legal materials of decision and consider moral, political,
empirical, prudential, and institutional issues, including the public acceptability of a
decision recognizing the new right.
Id (second alteration in original) (quoting Richard A. Posner, Should There Be Homosexual
Marriage? And If So, Who Should Decide?, 95 MICH. L. REv. 1578, 1585 (1997)). In Perry v.
Schwarzenegger, 704 F. Supp. 2d 921, 993 (N.D. Cal. 2010), however, the district court held the
following:
Plaintiffs do not seek recognition of a new right. To characterize plaintiffs' objective as
"the right to same-sex marriage" would suggest that plaintiffs seek something different
from what opposite-sex couples across the state enjoy-namely, marriage. Rather,
plaintiffs ask California to recognize their relationships for what they are: marriages.
One problem with Perry's reasoning is that there is no evidence, for due process purposes, to support
the idea that the history and practice of marriage has involved any sort of recognition of same-sex
relationships, see supra note 95, nor is there evidence, for equal protection purposes, that sexual
orientation is recognized as a protected class, see infra note 142. Additionally, there is some dispute
over the precedential value of Baker v. Nelson, 409 U.S. 810 (1972), dismissing appealfrom 191
N.W.2d 185 (Minn. 1971). There, the Supreme Court dismissed a Fourteenth Amendment challenge
"for want of a substantial federal question" to the Minnesota Supreme Court's decision to deny the
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A.

Romer v. Evans

In 1992, Colorado voters passed a statewide referendum known as
Amendment 2."' This amendment to the Colorado Constitution was found
to have the explicit intent of preventing any and all government action that
was designed to protect gay and lesbian individuals from discrimination in
the State of Colorado." 8 Colorado voters passed Amendment 2 as a
issuance of a same-sex marriage license. Id. at 810. Unlike a denial of certiorari, "[a] dismissal for
want of a substantial federal question[] is a disposition on the merits" and serves as binding
precedent for federal circuit courts, federal district courts, and all state courts. Hicks v. Miranda,
422 U.S. 332, 344-45 (1975) (quoting CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF
FEDERAL COURTS 495 (2d ed. 1970)). This type of precedent, however, is only dispositive of "the
specific challenges presented in the statement of jurisdiction," and it does not validate the reasoning
of the court whose judgment is appealed. Mandel v. Bradley, 432 U.S. 173, 176 (1977) (per
curiam). Moreover, the Supreme Court's dismissal "for want of a substantial federal question"
serves as precedent as long as there are no "doctrinal developments [that] indicate otherwise."
Hicks, 422 U.S. at 344 (quoting Port Auth. Bondholders Protective Comm. v. Port. of N.Y. Auth.,
387 F.2d 259, 262 n.3 (2d Cir. 1967)). In Smelt v. County of Orange, 374 F. Supp. 2d 861, 872-73
(C.D. Cal. 2005), rev'd on other grounds, 447 F.3d 673 (9th Cir. 2006), the court distinguished
Baker as not having precedential value in a Fourteenth Amendment challenge to DOMA. There, in
distinguishing Baker, the court noted the difference between Minnesota law regulating "the type of
relationship [that] could [be] sanctiflied] as a marriage" and federal law defining "who will receive
the federal rights and responsibilities of marriage." Id. According to the court, the "issue of
allocating benefits is different from the issue of sanctifying a relationship." Id. at 873. Even though
this reasoning may undercut Baker's precedential value in a Fourteenth Amendment challenge to
DOMA, it also supports the idea that DOMA is, in fact, consistent with the Tenth Amendment and
the constitutional principle that family law is an area of traditional state concern. See supra note 77
and accompanying text. In Smelt, the court also noted that "Supreme Court cases decided since
Baker show the Supreme Court does not consider unsubstantial a constitutional challenge brought by
homosexual individuals" on equal protection or due process grounds. Smelt, 374 F. Supp. 2d at 873
(citing Romer and Lawrence as examples). These intervening cases could possibly demonstrate
doctrinal developments to the contrary of Baker, which might mean that Baker no longer has
precedential value. See Hicks, 422 U.S. at 344. The remainder of this comment, however, will
discuss why Romer and Lawrence should not be relied on as precedent in finding a new
constitutional right to same-sex marriage. See infra notes 117-79 and accompanying text.
117. Romer, 517 U.S. at 623.
118. Id. at 624. The text of Amendment 2 stated:
No Protected Status Based on Homosexual, Lesbian or Bisexual Orientation. Neither the
State of Colorado, through any of its branches or departments, nor any of its agencies,
political subdivisions, municipalities or school districts, shall enact, adopt or enforce any
statute, regulation, ordinance or policy whereby homosexual, lesbian or bisexual
orientation, conduct, practices or relationships shall constitute or otherwise be the basis of
or entitle any person or class of persons to have or claim any minority status, quota
preferences, protected status or claim of discrimination. This Section of the Constitution
shall be in all respects self-executing.
Id. There was considerable disagreement about the scope and meaning of Amendment 2 and its
effect on gay and lesbian individuals in the State of Colorado. See Timothy M. Tymkovich, John
Daniel Dailey & Paul Farley, A Tale of Three Theories: Reason and Prejudice in the Battle over
Amendment 2, 68 U. COLO. L. REV. 287, 294-98 (1997). The complexity of Amendment 2's
language made it difficult to interpret, and because the lawsuit in Romer asserted a facial
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response to the enactment of ordinances that prohibited same-sex
discrimination in several municipalities, such as Aspen, Boulder, and
Denver." 9 The U.S. Supreme Court ruled that Amendment 2 was
unconstitutional as a violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment.120 The Court applied the rational basis test and
found that the amendment could be rooted in nothing more than animus
toward gay and lesbian individuals.12' As a result, Amendment 2, according
to the Court, did not pass the rational basis test because "a bare . . . desire to

harm a politically unpopular group
governmental interest." 22
Some commentators have speculated
on the road to making sexual orientation
of the Equal Protection Clause of

cannot constitute a legitimate
that Romer might be the first step
a quasi-suspect class for purposes
the Fourteenth Amendment.12 3

constitutional challenge, the courts did not have the benefit ofreviewing its official construction and
application by the State of Colorado. Id. at 294. The U.S. Supreme Court, however, did rely on the
Colorado Supreme Court's interpretation of the amendment. Romer, 517 U.S. at 626. The State of
Colorado argued for a narrow interpretation of Amendment 2 and claimed that the amendment
merely precluded governmental entities from creating special privileges or rights for gay and lesbian
individuals. See id. The big question was whether Amendment 2 prevented the government from
enforcing any general enactment that protected gays and lesbians from discrimination. Tymkovich
et al., supra, at 295-96. Opponents of Amendment 2 argued for a broader interpretation of
Amendment 2 and suggested that it interfered with the ability of state courts to adjudicate claims of
general discrimination against gays and lesbians. Id. at 296. The U.S. Supreme Court eventually
agreed with a broad interpretation of the amendment. See Romer, 517 U.S. at 626-27.
119. Romer, 517 U.S. at 623-24.
120. Id. at 635-36. The U.S. Supreme Court asserted a different legal theory to invalidate
Amendment 2 than the Colorado Supreme Court did. See Tymkovich et al., supra note 118, at 288.
The Colorado Supreme Court found that there is a fundamental right under the Fourteenth
Amendment to equal participation in the political process and also held that any infringement on this
right is subject to strict scrutiny. Collis, supra note 112, at 1000. The U.S. Supreme Court,
however, invalidated Amendment 2 on the theory that the amendment has the effect of putting gays
and lesbians "in a solitary class with respect to transactions and relations in both the private and
governmental spheres." Romer, 517 U.S. at 627. The holding in Romer rested on the argument that
Amendment 2 had far reaching implications to gay and lesbian individuals beyond the scope of
simply repealing the various municipal ordinances passed throughout the State of Colorado. See id.
at 627-31.
121. See Romer, 517 U.S. at 632. Some jurists argue that the application of the rational basis
standard makes Romer a pyrrhic victory for gay rights activists because lower courts continue to
uphold laws that would be struck down if heightened scrutiny were applied. See Robert D. Dodson,
Homosexual Discriminationand Gender: Was Romer v. Evans Really a Victory for Gay Rights?, 35
CAL. W. L. REv. 271, 289-90 (1999); cf Greene, supra note 82, at 1991 (arguing that traditional
marriage statutes cannot be struck down unless some form of heightened scrutiny is applied). But cf
Kevin H. Lewis, Note, Equal Protection after Romer v. Evans: Implications for the Defense of
MarriageAct and Other Laws, 49 HASTINGS L.J. 175, 177-78 (1997) (proposing "a framework for
understanding how courts might use the rational basis test to invalidate prejudicial classifications
against gays and lesbians . . .").
122. Romer, 517 U.S. at 634-35 (quoting Dep't of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 534 (1973)).
123. See, e.g., Tobias Barrington Wolff, PrincipledSilence: Romer v. Evans, 106 YALE L.J. 247,
250-52 (1996) (comparing the rational basis review from Romer to the development of heightened
scrutiny with respect to sex discrimination and concluding that Romer is consistent with a future
finding of heightened scrutiny with respect to sexual orientation). If sexual orientation was
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Additionally, Romer stands for the proposition that anti-gay bias can never
be a legitimate legislative end. 124 Commentators use these concepts to
support the idea that the traditional definition of marriage is unconstitutional
on equal protection grounds. 125 There is little legal precedent, however, for
extending the holding of Romer in this manner.12 6
In Romer, the U.S. Supreme Court relied on the Colorado Supreme
Court's interpretation of Amendment 2,127 and thus, it is appropriate to rely
on the California Supreme Court's construction of Proposition 8 in Strauss
v. Horton28 in order to determine Romer's applicability to the current
situation in California. 129 In Strauss, the California Supreme Court was
forced to rule on the constitutionality of a proposition designed to overrule
its previous decision to extend the right of marriage to same-sex couples.' 30
recognized as a quasi-suspect class, then the government would have to demonstrate that
classifications related to sexual orientation are substantially related to an important state interest.
Wadhwani, supra note 9, at 805. As mentioned previously, only gender and illegitimacy are
currently recognized as quasi-suspect classes. Id.
124. See Romer, 517 U.S. at 635.
125. See Lewis, supra note 121, at 177.
126. See William C. Duncan, The Legacy of Romer v. Evans-So Far, 10 WIDENER J. PUB. L.
161, 165-84 (2001). There are a few state cases that may have persuasive implications for possible
attempts to cite Romer in a challenge to state marriage laws passed through the referendum process.
See id. at 183-84. For example, the Supreme Court of Kansas rejected reliance on Romer in a
lawsuit against the state tax code for differential treatment of married and unmarried persons. Peden
v. Kansas, 930 P.2d 1, 12-14 (Kan. 1996). The court held that the differential tax rate was
constitutional because it was unlike Amendment 2 in Colorado in that Kansas had a legitimate state
interest in encouraging marriage in society. Id. at 17-18. Additionally, a state appellate court in
Texas espoused similar reasoning when it validated a proposition that overturned a city's policy of
providing domestic partner benefits to public employees. See Bailey v. City of Austin, 972 S.W.2d
180, 188-89 (Tex. App. 1998). In a case similar to Romer, the Sixth Circuit upheld a local charter
initiative that excluded protection against discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation. Equal.
Found. of Greater Cincinnati, Inc. v. City of Cincinnati, 128 F.3d 289, 300-01 (6th Cir. 1997). The
court found this case distinguishable from Romer because it involved a citywide, not statewide,
policy. Duncan, supra, at 183. Additionally, the initiative only banned preferential treatment on the
basis of sexual orientation, and it passed the rational basis test because it would save the city money.
Id.
127. Romer, 517 U.S. at 626. The U.S. Supreme Court relied on the Colorado Supreme Court's
interpretation of Amendment 2 because a preliminary injunction prevented the amendment from
taking effect before various courts were able to review its constitutionality. See id. at 625. Unlike
Romer, where Amendment 2 was enjoined from becoming a part of the Colorado Constitution, see
id., Proposition 8 became part of the state constitution shortly after its passage by a majority of
voters in the State of California. See Strauss v. Horton, 207 P.3d 48, 59 (Cal. 2009). This difference
between the two amendments, however, is not legally significant for purposes of the foregoing
analysis.
128. 207 P.3d 48 (Cal. 2009).
129. See infra notes 130-34 and accompanying text.
130. See M.K.B. Darmer & Tiffany Chang, Moving Beyond the "Immutability Debate" in the
Fightfor EqualityAfter Proposition8, 12 SCHOLAR 1, 35-36 (2009). As mentioned previously, In re
MarriageCases held that gay and lesbian individuals had a fundamental right under the privacy and
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The court ultimately held that Proposition 8 was a valid amendment to the
state constitution, but the estimated 18,000 same-sex marriages performed
before the passage of Proposition 8 were still considered valid because
Proposition 8 could not be applied retroactively. 31
When considering the overall scope and meaning of Proposition 8, the
court held that the amendment did not abrogate same-sex couples' privacy
and due process rights or fundamentally alter the substance of state equal
protection principles as articulated by In re Marriage Cases. 132 Instead,
Proposition 8 created a narrowly defined exception to these constitutional
rights with respect to the designation of marriage. 133 According to the
California Supreme Court, state voters were voting for a state constitutional
amendment in order to overturn the specific holding of In re Marriage
Cases.134

due process provisions of the state constitution to form legally recognized family relationships with
their partner of choice. See supra note 87. Additionally, the California Supreme Court found that
sexual orientation was a suspect class for equal protection purposes and ruled that it was
unconstitutional for the state to withhold the designation of marriage to same-sex couples. See supra
notes 87, 89.
131. See supra note 14 and accompanying text. The California Supreme Court articulated two
different rationales for why Proposition 8 constituted a valid amendment to the California
Constitution. Strauss, 207 P.3d at 98-100. First, the brevity and simplicity of the amendment
demonstrated that Proposition 8 could not constitute a constitutional revision. Id. at 98. Second,
Proposition 8 was limited in scope and meaning such that it only withheld the designation of
marriage from same-sex couples, and it was a constitutional amendment because it did not
substantially alter California's basic governmental framework. Id. at 98-100. With respect to the
retroactivity component, the California Supreme Court noted that enacted law generally applies
prospectively, unless there is a clear legislative or voter intent to the contrary. Id. at 119-20.
According to the court, neither the language of the initiative nor the accompanying ballot materials
provide a clear indication that Proposition 8 was intended to apply retroactively. Id. at 471-73.
Additionally, the court rejected the argument that the measure should be applied retroactively
because it was written in the present tense. Id. at 120-21. Thus, the court ruled that the measure
should be construed as applying prospectively, thereby holding that the same-sex marriages,
performed before the passage of Proposition 8, remained valid. Id. at 122.
132. Strauss,207 P.3d at 61.
133. Id. at 61-62. According to the California Supreme Court, Proposition 8 leaves unchanged
the right of gay and lesbian individuals to form an established family relationship with the person of
their own choosing and the constitutional guarantee of equal protection under the law. Id. at 61.
The California Supreme Court also indicated that a state appellate court's interpretation of California
Family Code section 308.5 supported a finding that Proposition 8 had a narrow and limited effect on
same-sex couples' state constitutional rights. See id. at 76. Proposition 8 and California Family
Code section 308.5 contained identical language-"Only marriage between a man and a woman is
valid or recognized in California." Id. In Knight v. Superior Court, 26 Cal. Rptr. 3d 687 (Ct. App.
2005), section 308.5 was interpreted as limiting same-sex couples' right to the designation of
marriage but not as precluding them from possessing similar substantive rights. Strauss, 207 P.3d at
76.
134. See Frederick Mark Gedicks, Atmospheric Harms in Constitutional Law, 69 MD. L. REV.
149, 149 n.3 (2009). In addition to the reasoning from the Knight case, the California Supreme
Court pointed to two other reasons why Proposition 8 should be interpreted as having a narrow
meaning and effect. See Strauss, 207 P.3d at 76-77. First, a much broader initiative was circulated
in California as an alternative to Proposition 8, but this initiative did not garner the requisite number
of signatures to be placed on the November 2008 ballot. Id. at 76 n.8. This broader measure would
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At first glance, there are striking similarities between the passage of
Amendment 2 in Colorado and Proposition 8 in California,'35 but a closer
look reveals a few important legal distinctions of significance, which make
Amendment 2 distinguishable from Proposition 8.136 Unlike in Romer,
where Amendment 2 was found to have a much broader effect than just
reversing recently-passed municipal ordinances banning same-sex
discrimination,13 7 Proposition 8 had the limited effect of overturning only the
specific holding of In re Marriage Cases.'" Whereas Amendment 2
prevented the government from enforcing any general legislation that
protected gays and lesbians from discrimination,139 Proposition 8 only
not only have defined marriage between a man and a woman, but it also would have mandated the
following: "[n]either the Legislature nor any court, government institution, government agency,
initiative statute, local government, or government official shall . . . bestow statutory rights,
incidents, or employee benefits of marriage on unmarried individuals." Id. Second, the court looked
to the arguments in favor Proposition 8 as stated in the official ballot that was circulated by the
California Secretary of State. Id. at 77. As a rebuttal argument, the official ballot explicitly stated
that Proposition 8 would not eliminate the state constitutional right of gay and lesbian individuals to
form officially recognized family relationships with their partner of choice. Id. The rebuttal
argument stated: "Your YES vote on Proposition 8 means that only marriage between a man and a
woman will be valid or recognized in California, regardless of when or where performed. But Prop.
8 will NOT take away any other rights or benefits ofgay couples." Id. at 77 n.9.
135. See supra notes 117-34 and accompanying text. As in the Amendment 2 context, where
voters in Colorado ratified a state constitutional amendment through the referendum process, Romer
v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 623 (1996), California voters ratified a constitutional amendment by ballot
initiative, Strauss,207 P.3d at 114, 119. Like Romer, where the amendment took away certain rights
that were formerly granted to gay and lesbian individuals through municipal ordinances that banned
same-sex discrimination, Romer, 517 U.S. at 623-24, Proposition 8 eliminated the right to same-sex
marriage that had been created by the California Supreme Court in In re Marriage Cases, see
Strauss, 207 P.3d at 75-77.
136. See infra text accompanying notes 137-42.
137. See supra note 118 and accompanying text. The U.S. Supreme Court in Romer determined
that Amendment 2 not only precluded state agencies from providing special rights to gay and lesbian
individuals, but it could also be inferred that the broad language of the measure prevented Colorado
from protecting these individuals from general discrimination. Romer, 517 U.S. at 630. According
to the Court, even if these individuals could be protected from discrimination, Amendment 2
imposed a special disability on them. Id. at 631. As the Court reasoned, if gay and lesbian
individuals were specifically targeted for discrimination, they would have to seek safe harbor in laws
of general application or enlist the Colorado citizenry to re-amend the state constitution in order to
receive protection. Id.
138. See supra note 134 and accompanying text.
139. See supra note 118 and accompanying text. Justice Kennedy specifically described the
Court's interpretation of Amendment 2's effect as follows:
Homosexuals are forbidden the safeguards that others enjoy or may seek without
constraint. They can obtain specific protection against discrimination only by enlisting
the citizenry of Colorado to amend the State Constitution or perhaps, on the State's view,
by trying to pass helpful laws of general applicability. This is so no matter how local or
discrete the harm, no matter how public and widespread the injury. We find nothing
special in the protections Amendment 2 withholds. These are protections taken for
granted by most people either because they already have them or do not need them; these
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created a narrow exception to the privacy, due process, and equal protection
rights of same-sex couples under the California Constitution.14 0 Unlike in
Romer, where Justice Anthony Kennedy concluded that Amendment 2 could
be rooted in nothing more than animus toward gay and lesbian individuals
because of the measure's sweeping effect,141 the scope of Proposition 8 was
limited specifically to the designation of marriage.14 2 Thus, Kennedy's
rationale from Romer should not be used to argue that Proposition 8 is
rooted in nothing more than animus toward gay and lesbian individuals.14 3

are protections against exclusion from an almost limitless number of transactions and
endeavors that constitute ordinary civic life in a free society.
Romer, 517 U.S. at 631.
140. See supra notes 132-33 and accompanying text.
141. See supra notes 121-22 and accompanying text.
142. See Romer, 517 U.S. at 632; see also supra notes 132-34 and accompanying text. Currently,
the U.S. Supreme Court has not identified sexual orientation as a suspect or quasi-suspect class. See
Jeremy B. Smith, The Flaws of Rational Basis with Bite: Why the Supreme Court Should
Acknowledge Its Application of Heightened Scrutiny to ClassificationsBased on Sexual Orientation,
73 FORDHAM L. REv. 2769, 2770 (2005). Because sexual orientation was not a suspect or quasisuspect class at the time, Romer used the rational basis test to declare Amendment 2
unconstitutional, Romer, 517 U.S. at 632, and as a result, this portion of this comment assumes
rational basis scrutiny in order to distinguish the Proposition 8 factual scenario from the
circumstances surrounding the passage of Amendment 2 in Colorado. Moreover, in Citizens for
Equal Protection v. Bruning, 455 F.3d 859, 866 (8th Cir. 2006), the Eighth Circuit relied on Romer
in applying the rational basis test to Nebraska's enactment of its constitutional marriage amendment.
The application of the rational basis test to Proposition 8 is also consistent with the Supreme Court's
rationale in Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 720 (1997), which essentially cautioned
against the creation of new constitutional rights under the Fourteenth Amendment. Whereas
Amendment 2 did not pass the rational basis test because of its broad effect, see id., Proposition 8
had a narrow effect and was limited to the designation of marriage because its primary purpose was
to overrule the specific holding of In re Marriage Cases, see Gedicks, supra note 134, at 149 n.3.
As mentioned previously, the rational basis test allows the state to be both under-inclusive and overinclusive when drawing boundaries with respect to marriage for purposes of the state's legitimate
interest in furthering procreation. See supra notes 81-82; see also Skinner v. Oklahoma ex rel.
Williamson, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942) ("Marriage and procreation are fundamental to the very
existence and survival of the [human] race."). In Perry v. Schwarzenegger, 704 F. Supp. 2d 921,
992 (N.D. Cal. 2010), the district court properly noted that the government has never inquired into
the procreative capacity of couples, or their intent to have children, before issuing marriage licenses.
This practice would result in an unconstitutional intrusion into the privacy of the marital bedroom,
see infra notes 149-50 and accompanying text, but there is nothing that precludes the government
from using a general, physiological understanding of procreative capacity in determining the
definition of marriage, see Greene, supra note 82, at 1991. The use of a general understanding of
procreation, without an intrusion into the privacy of the marital bedroom, is precisely the reason for
the under-inclusiveness and over-inclusiveness of traditional marriage laws. As a result, a traditional
definition of marriage, although seemingly arbitrary, should pass constitutional muster under the
rational basis test. See id.; see also Heller v. Doe, 509 U.S. 312, 319 (1993) ("[Rjational-basis
review in equal protection analysis is not a license for courts to judge the wisdom, fairness, or logic
of legislative choices." (internal quotation marks omitted)); Vance v. Bradley, 440 U.S. 93, 108
(1979) ("Even if the classification involved here is to some extent both underinclusive and
overinclusive, and hence the line drawn .. . [is] imperfect, it is nevertheless the rule that in a case
like this perfection is by no means required." (internal quotation marks omitted)).
143. See supra notes 135-42 and accompanying text.
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B. Lawrence v. Texas
In 2003, the U.S. Supreme Court decided Lawrence, which declared a
This
Texas state statute that criminalized sodomy unconstitutional.'"
14S
v.
Hardwick,
in
Bowers
precedent
existing
decision directly overturned
where a similar state statute from Georgia was upheld in 1986.146 In
Lawrence, Justice Kennedy relied on the liberty interest in the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to invalidate the Texas anti-sodomy
law.147 Kennedy redefined the issue from Bowers and framed it as one

144. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578-79 (2003).
145. 478 U.S. 186 (1986), overruled by Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 578.
146. Id. at 188, 196. In Bowers, the U.S. Supreme Court refused to take a more expansive view of
the Due Process Clause and to find that there was a fundamental right to engage in sodomy. See id.
at 194-95. At the time, approximately twenty-five states had existing anti-sodomy laws, and the
Court was extremely hesitant to expand the reach of certain substantive rights without express
authority from the U.S. Constitution. Id. at 195. In the Court's opinion, Justice White asserted that
"[t]he Court is most vulnerable and comes nearest to illegitimacy when it deals with judge-made
constitutional law having little or no cognizable roots in the language or design of the Constitution."
Id. at 194. There were a number of intervening events, however, between the Bowers decision in
1986 and the Lawrence decision in 2003 that served to undermine the rationale and holding of
Bowers. See Jessica A. Gonzalez, DecriminalizingSexual Conduct: The Supreme Court Ruling in
Lawrence v. Texas, 35 ST. MARY'S L.J. 685, 693-99 (2004). First, there were a number of U.S.
Supreme Court cases that interpreted the liberty interest protected by the Due Process Clause in the
Fourteenth Amendment. Id. at 693-94; see also infra notes 147-63 and accompanying text.
Additionally, when Lawrence was decided in 2003, the number of states with anti-sodomy laws had
decreased from twenty-five, at the time of the Bowers decision, to only thirteen. See Lawrence, 539
U.S. at 559. Interestingly, there are forty-five states that currently define marriage as only being
between a man and a woman. See supra note 204 and accompanying text.
147. Gonzalez, supra note 146, at 693-94. The Due Process Clause provides that no state shall
"deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law." U.S. CONST. amend
XIV, § 1. This right to liberty in the Due Process Clause was originally interpreted as being freedom
from restraint. See Julia M. Glencer, An 'Atypical and Significant' Barrierto Prisoners'Procedural
Due Process Claims Based on State-CreatedLiberty Interests, 100 DiCK. L. REv. 861, 875 (1996).
Over time, however, the right to liberty was understood to include other values and freedoms,
including interests such as reputation, see, e.g., Wisconsin v. Constantineau, 400 U.S. 433, 437
(1971), and personal autonomy, see, e.g., Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923), which are
important part of preserving democracy, see Glencer,supra, at 875. In Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693,
710 (1976), Chief Justice William Rehnquist mentioned that there are a variety of interests that can
be classified as pertaining to liberty. According to Justice Rehnquist, there are those interests that
are recognized by the U.S. Constitution and are protected directly by the Due Process Clause. Id. at
710-11. Additionally, there are state-created liberties that are not recognized by the U.S.
Constitution, but some of them, such as the right to a driver's license, are nevertheless entitled to
protection under the Due Process Clause. See id. at 711. According to Board of Regents of State
Colleges v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 570-71 (1972), courts must not look to the weight but to the nature
of the interest at stake in determining whether a state-created liberty interest is entitled to protection
under the Due Process Clause. In other words, the interest must come within the ambit of the Due
Process Clause's protection of liberty. Id. at 571. As this comment argues, the interest in obtaining
government recognition of one's same-sex marriage does not arise under the Fourteenth
Amendment's protection of liberty as a right recognized by the U.S. Constitution, nor is it a state-
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striking at the heart of liberty in this country.14 8 Kennedy also traced the
development of case law, starting with Griswold v. Connecticut,149 which
articulated a right to make one's own decisions regarding sexual conduct.'50
After detailing a progression of case law that interpreted the liberty interest
in the Due Process Clause,' the Lawrence opinion shifted its focus to
Bowers as a wrongly decided anomaly in this trend of cases regarding
personal decisions of sexual conduct.'52
Justice Kennedy believed that Justice Byron White misunderstood the
issue presented to the Court in Bowers.'
White framed the issue as
whether there was a constitutional right to engage in sodomy, but Kennedy
believed that the issue should be framed in the context of liberty.15 4 In
Lawrence, Kennedy rearticulated the reasoning from PlannedParenthoodv.

Casey'5 by explaining that the Court's "obligation is to define the liberty of
all, not to mandate [its] own moral code."15 6 He believed that the Texas

created right entitled to protection under the Due Process Clause. See infra notes 148-201 and
accompanying text.
148. See Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 564, 571. Justice Kennedy references the fact that there have
been various voices throughout history defining notions of moral and acceptable behavior, but
according to Kennedy, these convictions do not pertain to the question presented to the Court. Id. at
571. He redefines the issue as being "whether the majority may use the power of the State to enforce
these views on the whole society through operation of the criminal law." Id. In this way, Kennedy
redefines the issue as one of liberty and conclusively rejects the idea that that government can
mandate its own moral code. Id.
149. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
150. Gonzalez, supra note 146, at 693. Justice Kennedy began the discussion with reference to
the Court's invalidation of a state statute in Griswold that banned the use of contraceptives and the
provision of counseling related to the use of contraception. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 564. The
rationale for the Griswold decision rested on the right to privacy and the intimate nature of the
marital bedroom. Id. at 564-65. After Griswold, the Court extended this same right to unwed
couples on equal protection grounds in Eisenstadtv. Baird, 405 U.S. 438,454-55 (1972).
151. See Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 564-66. Griswold and Eisenstadt set the stage for the Court's
decision in Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973). There, the Court relied on the notion of personal
privacy to invalidate a Texas state statute banning abortions, discussing how a woman's right to an
abortion should be grounded in the protections of personal liberty found in the U.S. Constitution. Id.
at 153-54. According to the Court, this protection of a woman's personal liberty would preclude
states from banning abortion. See id. at 153. The Court later reaffirmed Roe in PlannedParenthood
v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 871 (1992). In reaffirming Roe, the Court relied heavily on the Fourteenth
Amendment as setting forth the foundational concept of the right of personal privacy. Casey, 505
U.S.at 847-49, 898, 901.
152. See Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 566-68.
153. Id. at 566-67.
154. See id. at 566-67. Justice White framed the issue in Bowers as being whether gay and
lesbian individuals have a constitutional right to engage in sodomy. Id. Justice Kennedy, however,
believed that White's framing of the issue demonstrated "the Court's own failure to appreciate the
extent of the liberty at stake." Id. at 567. According to Kennedy, "[t]o say that the issue in Bowers
was simply the right to engage in certain sexual conduct demeans the claim the individual put
forward, just as it would demean a married couple were it to be said marriage is simply about the
right to have sexual intercourse." Id.
155. 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
156. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 571 (quoting Casey, 505 U.S. at 850).
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anti-sodomy statute had far-reaching implications for liberty in society
because the state law allowed the government to intrude into decisions of
sexual intimacy that regularly occurred in the home, the most private of all
places.'
The Kennedy opinion in Lawrence also invalidated the statute for other
reasons beyond asserting that anti-sodomy laws violated the liberty interest
of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.' Two important
cases had changed the legal landscape that once supported the holding of
Bowers.15 9 Casey had affirmed the principle that there was a liberty interest
in "personal decisions relating to marriage, procreation, contraception,
family relationships, child rearing, and education,"160 and Romer had held
that a constitutional amendment found to have been passed out of mere
animus toward gay and lesbian individuals could not have a legitimate
governmental purpose.' 6 ' Additionally, the political landscape had changed.
There were twenty-five states that had previously enacted anti-sodomy laws
at the time of Bowers, but when Lawrence was decided, there were only

157. Id. at 567. Justice Kennedy found it particularly important that this case concerned a
criminal statute. Id. It was Kennedy's view that criminal penalties, even minor ones, attached a
stigma that was not trivial. Id. at 575. According to Kennedy, the arm of the state should not be
used to create this societal stigma through the enforcement of a criminal statute. Id. at 571.
158. See infra text accompanying notes 159-63.
159. Gonzalez, supra note 146, at 698.
160. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 573-74 (citing Casey, 505 U.S. at 851). Casey stated this proposition
in reference to the Court's discussion in Carey v. PopulationServices International,431 U.S. 678,
684-85 (1977). Carey explained that decisions related to marriage are "among the decisions that an
individual may make without unjustified government interference." Carey, 431 U.S. at 684-85
(citing Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967)). Because the Court in Carey relied on Loving as
authority for this principle, see id., Kennedy's reference to the same principle in Lawrence should be
understood in light of the holding in Loving. As will be discussed later in this comment, the Court's
holding in Loving should not be relied on as precedent in the Proposition 8 context. See infra notes
180-201 and accompanying text. Additionally, Carey explained that family relationships are also
protected from government interference by citing the Court's discussion in Prince v. Massachusetts,
321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944). In Prince, the Court was referring to constitutional protection for a
"parent's authority to provide religious with secular schooling, and the child's right to receive it, in
light of the state's requirement of attendance at public schools." Prince, 321 U.S. at 166. (citing
Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925)). Prince also referenced the child's right to receive
instruction in a language other than the nation's predominant language. Id. (citing Meyer v.
Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923)).
161. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 574 (quoting Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 634 (1996)). As has
been discussed earlier in this comment, there are significant legal distinctions between Amendment 2
in Colorado and Proposition 8 in California. See supra notes 135-43 and accompanying text.
Because of these important differences, it cannot be automatically assumed that Proposition 8 was
born out of mere animus toward gay and lesbian individuals. See supra notes 135-43 and
accompanying text. In fact, the limited effect of Proposition 8 actually indicates more strongly that
it was not born out of mere animus, and that Romer should not control in the federal lawsuit
challenging Proposition 8. See supra notes 141-43 and accompanying text.
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thirteen states in the Union with existing anti-sodomy statutes.'62 As part of
his conclusion, however, Kennedy specifically noted that the issue in
Lawrence did not involve governmental recognition of same-sex
relationships.16 1
Although the reasoning of Lawrence appears facially applicable to
Proposition 8,'6 there are legally significant factual differences that indicate
otherwise. 6 s Unlike Lawrence, where there was a criminal statute at
issue,'
Proposition 8 relates to the definition of marriage and does not
prescribe criminal penalties for engaging in same-sex relations.167 In fact,
Proposition 8 only carves out a limited exception with respect to the
designation of marriage and does not preclude gay and lesbian individuals
from forming established family relationships with the person of their own
choosing.'6 8 Whereas Lawrence involves conduct that occurs almost

162. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 573. Justice Kennedy also discussed the history of anti-sodomy laws
in the United States and mentioned that it was not until the 1970s that states began to target same-sex
intimacy for enforcement and prosecution. Id. at 568-70. At the time Lawrence was decided,
Kennedy indicated that only nine states had passed statutes that specifically targeted same-sex
relations. Id. at 570.
163. Id. at 578. Justice Kennedy actually noted that the Lawrence case did not concern a number
of different scenarios. Id. According to Kennedy, the situation did not involve minors, coerced
conduct, public conduct, prostitution, or formal recognition of same-sex relationships. Id. He
proceeded to note specifically that the Lawrence case involved two adult men who engaged in
consensual sexual activity within the private sphere, which constitutes "a realm of personal liberty"
protected from government intervention by the Constitution. Id. (quoting Casey, 505 U.S. at 847).
164. See supra notes 144-63 and accompanying text. The reasoning from Lawrence appears
facially applicable because Justice Kennedy refers to the societal stigma that many gay and lesbian
individuals faced as a result of various anti-sodomy statutes. See Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 573.
Additionally, Kennedy traced a line of cases that began to interpret the liberty interest of the
Fourteenth Amendment more expansively with regard to sexual conduct, which could lead many
observers to speculate that the liberty interest should include a right to same-sex marriage. See
supranotes 150-52 and accompanying text.
165. See infra notes 166-72 and accompanying text.
166. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 21.06(a) (Vernon 2003). The statute provided that: "A person
commits an offense if he engages in deviate sexual intercourse with another individual of the same
sex." Id. Deviate sexual intercourse was defined as follows: "(A) any contact between any part of
the genitals of one person and the mouth or anus of another person; or (B) the penetration of the
genitals or the anus of another person with an object." Id. §2 1.01(1).
167. See supranote 144, 157 and accompanying text.
168. Strauss v. Horton, 207 P.3d 48, 61 (Cal. 2009). Even after the enactment of Proposition 8,
same-sex couples could still obtain all the legal rights and incidents of marriage, available through
the state government, under California's domestic partnership program. See id. at 77. California
began a statewide registration program for domestic partners in 1999 with the enactment of AB 26.
Ben Johnson, Putative Partners: ProtectingCouples from the Consequences of Technically Invalid
Domestic Partnerships,95 CAL. L. REv. 2147, 2157 (2007). Under California law, committed samesex couples, or committed opposite-sex couples with one partner who is at least sixty-two years old,
can register with the state government under the domestic partnership program. CAL. FAM. CODE §
297 (West 2004). AB 26 set up a mostly symbolic statewide registration system for domestic
partners because this system only offered hospital visitation rights and dependent health care
benefits for government employees, and these rights were already offered to many same-sex couples
under similarly fashioned city and county registries. Johnson, supra, at 2159. The California state
legislature later granted all the legal rights and benefits of marriage to same-sex couples in a
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exclusively in the privacy of the bedroom,'69 Proposition 8 is distinct on a
spatial level because it involves governmental recognition of marriage,
which relates to activities outside the bedroom.7 o Unlike in Lawrence,
which was decided at a time when there were only thirteen states with
existing anti-sodomy laws," there are currently forty-five states that define
marriage as only being between one man and one woman.17 2
These factual differences appear to indicate that federal courts would
have to expand the interpretation of the liberty interest in the Due Process
Clause if they were to rely on Lawrence to invalidate Proposition 8.17 In
fact, Justice Kennedy's own words from the opinion illustrate this point:
"The present case ... does not involve whether the government must give
formal recognition to any relationship that homosexual persons seek to
enter." 74 Expansion of the Due Process Clause to encompass governmental

domestic partnership when it passed the Domestic Partner Rights and Responsibilities Act of 2003.
See Strauss, 207 P.3d at 67. Same-sex couples, however, were not entitled to the designation of
marriage until the California Supreme Court granted them this right in 2008. In re Marriage Cases,
183 P.3d 384, 452-53 (Cal. 2008), superseded by constitutional amendment, CAL. CONST. art. I, §
7.5, as recognized in Strauss,207 P.3d at 75-76, 122.
169. See supra note 157 and accompanying text.
170. See CAL. CONST. art. I, § 7.5.
171. See supra note 162 and accompanying text. Justice Kennedy took particular note of the fact
that only four of these thirteen states prohibited sodomy against only gay and lesbian individuals.
Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 573 (2003). Additionally, many of the states fell into a pattern of
non-enforcement with respect to these anti-sodomy statutes. Id. The State of Texas even admitted
that it had not prosecuted anyone under its statute since 1994. Id.
172. See supra note 79 and accompanying text. Although the number of state statutes,
constitutional provisions, or court decisions at issue would not be relevant if there is a clear
constitutional violation because of the Supremacy Clause, see U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2, there is a
degree of ambiguity and uncertainty when the federal judiciary is confronted with a newly proposed
right under the Fourteenth Amendment, see Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 720 (1997).
When confronted with a newly proposed right to die in Glucksberg, the U.S. Supreme Court
surveyed developments on the issue of assisted suicide in California, Oregon, Iowa, Rhode Island,
and New York. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 717-19. After surveying developments amongst the states,
the Court was reticent to interpret a new constitutional right arising out of the Fourteenth
Amendment because it was unwilling to cut off public debate on an issue for which it did not have
sufficient guidance from the Constitution or current precedent. See id. at 720. According to the
Court, the nation was "engaged in an earnest and profound debate about the morality, legality, and
practicality of physician-assisted suicide," and the Court believed that its holding allowed "this
debate to continue, as it should in a democratic society." Id. at 735. Moreover, at least one federal
court has noted that "public opinion is not irrelevant to the task of deciding whether a constitutional
right exists," especially when judges are considering a new constitutional right. Citizens for Equal
Prot. v. Bruning, 455 F.3d 859, 871 (2006) (quoting Posner, supra note 116, at 1585). Accordingly,
the federal judiciary would be wise to survey developments amongst the states on the issue of
marriage and consider the benefits to liberty and democracy of public debate amongst the states on
this controversial issue. See Glucksberg,521 U.S. at 735.
173. See supranotes 164-72 and accompanying text.
174. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 578.
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recognition of same-sex marriages, however, would create important
implications for liberty in this country."' As discussed in Part III of this
comment, the framers of the Constitution and succeeding generations of
jurists recognized federalism in family law as a fundamental restraint on the
accumulation of federal government power.' 6 By using the Fourteenth
Amendment to end the constitutional decision-making processes on
marriage that are currently occurring at the state level, the federal
government would be initiating a direct encroachment into the core domain
of family law.177 This type of encroachment, through an expansive
175. See infra notes 176-79, 207-11 and accompanying text. During the debate to ratify the U.S.
Constitution, there was great fear among the citizenry that the federal government would destroy
certain liberties enjoyed on a local level. THE FEDERALIST No. 33, at 201-02 (Alexander Hamilton)
(Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961). Opponents of the Constitution believed that the federal government
could use the Supremacy Clause and the Necessary and Proper Clause in tandem as an engine to
accomplish such destructive purposes. Id. Alexander Hamilton argued, however, that "it will not
follow from this doctrine [of supremacy] that acts of the large society which are not pursuant to its
constitutional powers, but which are invasions of the residuary authorities of the smaller societies,
will become the supreme law of the land." Id. at 204. Additionally, James Madison argued that
federalism and the separation of powers "to a certain extent [are] admitted on all hands to be
essential to the preservation of liberty." THE FEDERALIST No. 51, at 321 (James Madison) (Clinton
Rossiter ed., 1961). The Supreme Court's restraint in interpreting a right to die from the Due
Process Clause in Glucksberg demonstrates that these background principles of federalism should
also be given consideration when the federal judiciary is confronted with a newly proposed right
under the Fourteenth Amendment. See Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 720. This restrained approach to
interpreting newly proposed rights would preclude the Fourteenth Amendment from becoming
nothing more than a tool for implementing judicial policy preferences. Id.
176. See supra notes 48-58 and accompanying text. While maintenance of this federal balance
remains largely an issue of political judgment, the judiciary plays an important function in
preserving this balance as well. See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 577-78 (1995).
According to Lopez, "the federal balance is too essential a part of our constitutional structure and
plays too vital a role in securing freedom for us to admit inability to intervene when one or the other
level of Government has tipped the scales too far." Id. at 578. As a result, a number of judicial
doctrines reflect the important function that the judiciary plays in maintaining the federal balance.
Id. at 578-79. Some of these judicial doctrines include the following: abstention, see, e.g., Younger
v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 46 (1971) (discussing the fundamental policy against federal judicial
intervention in state criminal prosecutions); rules regarding when to apply substantive state law, see,
e.g., Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938) (asserting that the laws of the state should
be applied in diversity cases unless there is a federal statute or federal constitutional provision at
issue); and the preemption doctrine, see, e.g., Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230-31
(1947) (discussing the circumstances when federal legislation is supreme over state exercise of the
police power).
177. See supra note 48 and accompanying text. Currently, as in Glucksberg, where states were
rethinking bans on assisted suicide, Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 716-19, a number of states are engaged
in a thoughtful reexamination of their traditional marriage statutes, see supra notes 73-94 and
accompanying text. While many states are simply reaffirming traditional marriage statutes or
ratifying constitutional marriage amendments, see supra note 79 and accompanying text, other states
are taking a different course or coming up with alternative options for same-sex couples, see, e.g.,
Laura Mansnerus, Legislators Vote for Gay Unions in New Jersey, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 15, 2006, at
Al, availableat 2006 WLNR 21800756 (reporting on New Jersey's decision to provide civil unions
to same-sex couples in 2006). For example, Massachusetts, Connecticut, and Iowa granted
recognition of same-sex marriage through high-profile court decisions, and Vermont, New
Hampshire, and the District of Columbia recognized same-sex marriage through legislation. See
supra notes 80-93 and accompanying text. Other states, such as California, Arizona, and Florida,
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interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment, would upset the current
balance between the federal and state governments, which the founders
deemed essential for the preservation of the republic.'78 Thus, Lawrence
should not control with respect to Proposition 8 because an expansive
interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment, which includes a new right to
same-sex marriage, would have significantly negative ramifications for
individual liberty in this country.179
C. Loving v. Virginia
In 1967, the U.S. Supreme Court struck down miscegenation laws that
made it unlawful for a white person to marry a black person in the State of
Virginia.o80 At the time, Virginia was one of sixteen states that punished

have decided to reaffirm the traditional definition of marriage through state constitutional
amendments. Jessie McKinley & Laurie Goodstein, Bans in 3 States on Gay Marriage,N.Y. TIMES,
Nov. 6, 2008, at Al, available at 2008 WLNR 21173920. Additionally, while reaffirming the
traditional definition of marriage, some states are considering or have already created civil unions or
domestic partnerships as an alternative to same-sex marriage. See, e.g., The Associated Press,
Hawaii Debates Same-Sex Unions, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 23, 2009, at A17, available at 2009 WLNR
3483749 (reporting on the debate in the Hawai'i state legislature to provide civil unions to same-sex
couples); Steve Friess, Nevada Partnership Bill Now Law, N.Y. TIMES, June 1, 2009, at A12,
availableat 2009 WLNR 10345381 (noting that Nevada passed a domestic registry for same-sex and
unmarried, opposite-sex couples after a spirited debate in the state legislature); The Associated
Press, Hawaii: Governor Vetoes Same-Sex Unions, N.Y. TIMES, July 7, 2010, at A 1, available at
2010 WLNR 13576694 (reporting on the Hawai'i governor's reasons for vetoing a same-sex civil
union bill).
178. See supra note 58 and accompanying text. James Madison articulately explained that
"[aimbition must be made to counteract ambition." THE FEDERALIST No. 51, supra note 175, at 322
(James Madison). Madison believed that government was simply a reflection of human nature, and
as a result, certain controls needed to be set in place in order to provide a security against the abuses
of government. Id. The primary way of accomplishing this task was by dividing up various
departments of the government and providing them with rival and competing interests. Id.
Additionally, Madison believed that the administration of two governments, rather than a single
government, created a double security against tyranny and the abuse of governmental power. Id. at
323.
179. See supra notes 175-78 and accompanying text.
180. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 4-5, 11-12 (1967). The Lovings were convicted under two
miscegenation laws that were part of a comprehensive statutory scheme in Virginia. Id. at 4.
Specifically, the Lovings were convicted for leaving the State of Virginia and getting married in a
different state. Id. At the time, section 20-58 of the Virginia Code provided that anyone who
entered into an interracial marriage was guilty of a felony, which was punishable by confinement in
the state penitentiary for up to five years. Id. Section 20-59 further provided that a black and a
white person who married in a different state and returned to Virginia would be subject to the same
penalty under section 20-59, as if the marriage actually occurred in Virginia. Id. Section 20-59
provided that anyone who enters into an interracial marriage is guilty of a felony that is punishable
by confinement in the state penitentiary for up to five years. Id.
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people who entered into interracial marriages.' 8' In defense of the statutory
scheme, Virginia argued and the state supreme court agreed that, absent a
constitutional violation, marriage is a social relation subject to the state's
police power.182 The U.S. Supreme Court found, however, that the
miscegenation statutes in Virginia violated individual rights on both equal
protection and due process grounds.'8 3 When examining the statutes under
the Equal Protection Clause, the Court held that "[t]here is patently no
legitimate overriding purpose independent of invidious racial discrimination
which justifies this classification."'8 In assessing matters of due process,
the Court also found that "[t]he freedom to marry has long been recognized
as one of the vital personal rights essential to the orderly pursuit of
happiness by free men."'
A number of subsequent decisions cite Loving for the principle that
matters of personal choice in marriage are a constitutional right under the

181. Id. at 6.
182. Id. at 7. As part of its holding, the state court relied on Maynard v. Hill, 125 U.S. 190, 205
(1888), where the U.S. Supreme Court asserted that:
Marriage . . . has always been subject to the control of the legislature. That body
prescribes the age at which parties may contract to marry, the procedure or form essential
to constitute marriage, the duties and obligations it creates, its effects upon the property
rights of both, present and prospective, and the acts which may constitute grounds for its
dissolution.
The State of Virginia, however, did not dispute that there were limits on its regulation of marriage
based on Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923) and Skinner v. Oklahoma ex rel. Williamson, 316
U.S. 535 (1942). In Meyer, the U.S. Supreme Court articulated that "liberty may not be interfered
with, under the guise of protecting the public interest . . . ." Meyer, 262 U.S. at 399-400.
Ultimately, the State of Virginia unsuccessfully argued on appeal that the Equal Protection Clause
merely mandated equal penalty for both whites and blacks who entered into interracial marriages.
See Loving, 388 U.S. at 7-8, 11-12.
183. Loving, 388 U.S. at 11-12. When finding that the Virginia statute was unconstitutional on
equal protection grounds, the Court specifically noted that the Equal Protection Clause, at a
minimum should require strict scrutiny for invidious racial classifications, especially those that
proscribe criminal sanctions on the basis of race. Id. at 11. In fact, the Court noted that two of its
members even indicated that they could not think of a valid legislative purpose where it would be
constitutional to impose criminal sanctions on someone because of his or her skin color. Id.
Additionally, when describing the freedom to marry, the Court described discrimination based on
racial classifications as the characteristic of the Virginia statute that violated the central purpose of
the Equal Protection Clause. Id. at 12. When assessing matters of due process, the freedom to marry
was also understood as a freedom to choose one's partner irrespective of skin color. Id.
184. Id at 11.
185. Id. at 12 (citing Skinner, 316 U.S. at 541 and Maynard, 125 U.S. 190). In Skinner, the State
of Oklahoma passed the Habitual Criminal Sterilization Act, which allowed Oklahoma's Attorney
General to implement proceedings for the sterilization of individuals convicted of more than two
felonies of moral turpitude. Skinner, 316 U.S. at 536-37. The U.S. Supreme Court indicated that
the statute in question violated the Equal Protection Clause because it deprived convicts of "one of
the basic civil rights of man." Id. at 541. According to the Court, procreation and marriage are
fundamental to humankind's "very existence and survival." Id. In Maynard, the issue was whether
a couple's marriage could be dissolved through an act of the Oregon state legislature. See Maynard,
125 U.S. at 209. There, in deciding the legislature's authority to dissolve a marital union, the Court
referred to marriage "as creating the most important relation in life" and "as having more to do with
the morals and civilization of a people than any other institution." Id. at 205.
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Fourteenth Amendment.186 These decisions, however, should not be taken at
face value, but should only be read in light of the holding in Loving, which
was decided with the explicit understanding that "[t]he clear and central
purpose of the Fourteenth Amendment was to eliminate all official state
sources of invidious racial discrimination in the States.",17 Additionally, the
U.S. Supreme Court has discussed the significance of that goal of the
Fourteenth Amendment in other cases.' 8 These cases demonstrate that the
fundamental purpose of the Fourteenth Amendment was the preservation of
certain civil and political rights for former slaves.' 89 According to the Court,
186. See, e.g., Turner v. Safely, 482 U.S. 78, 95 (1987) (citing Loving for the principle "that the
decision to marry is a fundamental right"); Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 384 (1978)
(referencing Loving as a foundational case that confirms "that the right to marry is of fundamental
importance for all individuals"); Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678, 684-85 (1977)
(citing Loving for the proposition that "it is clear that among the decisions that an individual may
make without unjustified government interference are personal decisions relating to marriage . . .")
(internal quotation mark omitted); Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632, 639-40 (1974)
(citing Loving for the principle that "freedom of personal choice in matters of marriage and family
life is one of the liberties protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment").
187. Loving, 388 U.S. at 10. In Baker v. Nelson, 191 N.W.2d 185, 185, 187 (Minn. 1971), appeal
dismissed, 409 U.S. 810 (1972), the Minnesota Supreme Court explicitly rejected any reliance on
Loving in a case where a same-sex couple was denied issuance of a marriage license in the State of
Minnesota. According to the court, "Virginia's antimiscegenation statute, prohibiting interracial
marriages, was invalidated solely on the grounds of its patent racial discrimination." Id. at 187.
Thus, the Minnesota Supreme Court found that "there is a clear distinction between a restriction on
marriage based merely upon race and one based upon the fundamental difference in sex." Id. Even
though the U.S. Supreme Court dismissed the appeal "for want of a substantial federal question,"
Baker, 409 U.S. at 810, this type of dismissal does not affirm the reasoning of the Minnesota
Supreme Court, see Mandel v. Bradley, 432 U.S. 173, 176 (1977) (per curiam). Thus, the reasoning
of the Minnesota Supreme Court in Baker does not have precedential value in subsequent federal
cases. See Mandel, 432 U.S. at 176.
188. See, e.g., McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184, 192 (1964) ("[T]he central purpose of the
Fourteenth Amendment was to eliminate racial discrimination emanating from official sources in the
States."); Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 239 (1976) ("The central purpose of the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment is the prevention of official conduct discriminating
on the basis of race."); Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 904 (1995) (asserting that the Equal
Protection Clause's "central mandate is racial neutrality in governmental decisionmaking").
189. Shelley v. Kramer, 334 U.S. 1, 23 (1948). In Shelley, the Supreme Court stated:
The historical context in which the Fourteenth Amendment became a part of the
Constitution should not be forgotten. Whatever else the framers sought to achieve, it is
clear that the matter of primary concern was the establishment of equality in the
enjoyment of basic civil and political rights and the preservation of those rights from
discriminatory action on the part of the States based on considerations of race or color.
Id. This case involved a number of restrictive covenants on land that precluded African-American
families from purchasing the property at issue because of the color of their skin. Id. at 4-6. In
assessing the constitutionality of these covenants, the Court noted that the equal enjoyment of
property was an essential precondition for ensuring the basic civil and political rights that the
Fourteenth Amendment was designed to provide to African-Americans. Id. at 10. As a result, the
Court held that state judicial enforcement of these restrictive covenants was a violation of the Equal
Protection Clause, and the action of the state courts must be overturned as a violation of the
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the historical context surrounding the passage of the Fourteenth Amendment
should be considered when interpreting the Amendment, and its provisions
should "be construed with this fundamental purpose in mind." 90
Thus, even though the rationale in Loving appears applicable in the
Proposition 8 situation,"' federal courts should be guided by the
fundamental purpose of the Fourteenth Amendment when construing
Loving's meaning with respect to the issue of marriage. 19 2 Therefore,
references in Loving that describe the "the freedom to marry,"'9 3 or to
Loving's progeny, which explain that there is a constitutional right to
personal choice in matters relating to marriage and family relationships, 194
should not be taken at face value when analyzing Proposition 8.'9'
There are important differences that preclude Loving from being used as
precedent when determining whether there is a constitutional right to samesex marriage.196 Unlike in Loving, where Virginia's statutory scheme
imposed criminal penalties on those entering into interracial marriages,97

Fourteenth Amendment. Id. at 20.
190. Id. at 23 (citing Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. 36 (1872)). The Court explained that the
Fourteenth Amendment should be understood in light of its central purpose of securing certain basic
civil and political rights for those who had been discriminated against on the basis of race or color.
Id.
191. See supra notes 180-85 and accompanying text.
192. See supra notes 186-90 and accompanying text.
193. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967).
194. Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632, 639-40 (1974). In LaFleur, two female
public school teachers, who became pregnant during the course of their employment, were forced
into taking maternity leave and foregoing their salaries until the birth of their children. Id. at 63435. In assessing the constitutionality of the school's actions and policies, the Supreme Court cited
Loving for the principle that there is a constitutional freedom of choice with respect to matters of
marriage and family life. Id. at 639-40. The Court reasoned that the school's policy of mandatory
maternity leave placed an undue burden on an individual's ability to exercise freedom of choice with
respect to marriage and family life. Id. at 640. Other cases, such as Carey, also cite Loving for the
exact same principle, see Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678, 684-685 (1977), but it is
important to note the context in which this constitutional freedom of marital choice arises and the
rationale that led the Court to arrive at its conclusion, see supra notes 187-90 and accompanying
text.
195. See supra notes 186-90 and accompanying text. LaFleur is distinguishable from the
Proposition 8 context. Unlike in LaFleur, where public employees were forced to take a mandatory
maternity leave and forego their salaries until the birth of their children, LaFleur, 414 U.S. at 63435, Proposition 8 precludes private individuals from obtaining the civil designation of marriage for
their same-sex relationships, Strauss v. Horton, 207 P.3d 48, 75-76 (Cal. 2009). Additionally,
unlike LaFleur,where the Court noted that school policies placed an undue burden on the exercise
of individual freedoms with respect to marriage and family relationships, LaFleur,414 U.S. at 640,
same-sex couples in California enjoy all the legal rights and benefits of marriage that are available at
the state level, and Proposition 8 does nothing to prevent them from forming officially recognized
family relationships with the partner of their choice, Strauss, 207 P.3d at 75-76. Thus, LaFleur
should not be relied on as precedent in finding a new constitutional right to same-sex marriage.
196. See infra notes 197-200 and accompanying text.
197. See supra note 180 and accompanying text. Section 20-59 of the Virginia Code provided:
"Punishment for marriage.-If any white person intermarry with a colored person, or any colored
person intermarry with a white person, he shall be guilty of a felony and shall be punished by
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Proposition 8 merely withholds the designation of marriage from same-sex
couples. The State of California already provides same-sex couples with all
the rights and benefit that are associated with marriage at the state level.'98
Additionally, whereas Loving was decided with the Thirteenth and Fifteenth
Amendments as a guide in understanding the scope and meaning of the
Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses,'9 9 no such constitutional
provision or federal statute exists with respect to sexual orientation. 200 Thus,
Loving should not be relied on as precedent in finding a new constitutional
right to same-sex marriage because it would have the effect of cutting off
public debate on an important issue, which traditionally has been regulated
by the states because of their regulatory expertise in this area.20'
V.

LEGAL IMPLICATIONS OF FINDING A CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO
SEX MARRIAGE

SAME-

An expansive interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment would create
a number of legal implications for liberty and for the structural foundation of
this nation's governmental system. 202 By redefining marriage, the federal
confinement in the penitentiary for not less than one nor more than five years." VA. CODE ANN. §
20-59 (1960). Additionally, Section 20-57 of the Virginia Code provided: "Marriages void without
decree.-All marriages between a white person and a colored person shall be absolutely void without
any decree of divorce or other legal process." Id. § 20-57 (1960).
198. See supra notes 86, 132-34 and accompanying text. Same-sex couples currently receive all
the legal rights and benefits of marriage available at the state level through California's domestic
partnership program. See supra note 168 and accompanying text. In addition, as stated by the
California Supreme Court, Proposition 8 "does not purport to alter or affect the more general holding
in the Marriage Cases that same-sex couples, as well as opposite-sex couples, enjoy the
constitutional right, under the privacy and due process clauses of the California Constitution, to
establish an officially recognized family relationship." Strauss, 207 P.3d at 75.
199. See supranotes 186-90 and accompanying text.
200. See Luke A. Boso, Disrupting Sexual Categories of Intimate Preference, 21 HASTINGS
WOMEN'S L.J. 59, 64 n.9 (2010). As a caveat, Congress has passed the Matthew Shepard and James
Byrd, Jr. Hate Crimes Prevention Act in order to provide greater protection for individuals targeted
for violent crime based on their actual or perceived sexual orientation or gender identity. Legislation
& Regulations, 33 MENTAL & PHYSICAL DISABILITY L. REP. 1060, 1060 (2009).

201. See supranotes 107, 172, 191-200 and accompanying text.
202. See infra notes 206-14 and accompanying text. Even though Chief Justice John Marshall
espoused a broad interpretation of congressional authority under the implied power doctrine in
McCulloch and the Commerce Clause in Gibbons, Marshall still envisioned certain affirmative limits
on federal government power. See supra notes 49-50 and accompanying text. In Gibbons, the
Court noted that Congress could not regulate noncommercial, intrastate activities that did not affect
or concem other states. Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. 1, 194 (1824). This interpretation of
congressional power under the Commerce Clause implied a correlative sphere of state sovereignty
under the Tenth Amendment and provided states with certain police powers to regulate the public
health, safety, and welfare of their citizenries. Nelson & Pushaw, supra note 49, at 61-63.
Additionally, federal law was only supreme over the states if Congress passed legislation pursuant to
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judiciary would be interfering with the established principle that domestic
relations, as an area of traditional state concern, should be regulated on a
local level so long as that regulation does not violate a constitutional right.2 03
Additionally, such action would have the effect of overturning laws with
respect to marriage in a total of forty-five states.20 If the federal judiciary
were to strike down California's Proposition 8 on equal protection or due
process grounds, the same arguments and legal theories would also be
applicable to the laws and constitutional provisions of every other state in
the Union pursuant to the Supremacy Clause.205
As can be seen, the implications of finding a new constitutional right to
same-sex marriage are far-reaching.206 An expansive interpretation of the
Equal Protection Clause or the liberty interest provided for by the Due

the powers delegated to it by the Constitution. THE FEDERALIST No. 33, supra note 175, at 204
(Alexander Hamilton). Even though the Supreme Court has increasingly declined to recognize the
full import and significance of the Tenth Amendment after the New Deal, see supra note 97 and
accompanying text, an expansion of the Fourteenth Amendment to include the right of same-sex
marriage would interfere in an area that has traditionally been viewed as being the exclusive domain
of the states, see, e.g., Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U.S. 393, 404 (1975) (asserting that domestic relations is
"an area that has long been regarded as a virtually exclusive province of the States"). This
encroachment on the substantive limits of federal government power would perpetuate the decline of
the Tenth Amendment in this country's constitutional jurisprudence, see supra note 97 and
accompanying text, and it would weaken the ability of federalism to serve as a security against the
abuses of governmental power, see THE FEDERALIST No. 51, supra note 175, at 322-23 (James
Madison).
203. See supra notes 24, 48-72 and accompanying text. As an anecdotal example, Hawai'i was
able to conclusively resolve its definition of marriage in the 1990s because the federal government
left the decision exclusively within the sovereign province of the Hawai'i state government. See
supra notes 8-16 and accompanying text. Additionally, Alaska faced a similar scenario, and voters
were allowed to ratify a constitutional marriage amendment without federal government
intervention. See supra notes 17-22 and accompanying text. Even though no federal lawsuit was
filed against the Hawai'i constitutional marriage amendment, the factual and legal similarities
between the scenarios in Hawai'i and Alaska and Proposition 8 in California demonstrate the
importance of considering background principles of federalism when assessing newly proposed
rights with respect to same-sex marriage. See supra note 23-31 and accompanying text.
Background principles of federalism remain essential in securing important freedoms in this country,
and the federal judiciary, as much as any other branch of government, has a role to play in
preserving the federalist balance. See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 578 (1995).
204. Currently, there are twenty-nine states with popularly enacted constitutional marriage
amendments, Chehardy, supra note 79, at 318, but this figure does not include Hawai'i, which has a
constitutional amendment that gives the state legislature the power to limit marriage to opposite-sex
couples, see supra note 79 and accompanying text. If the Supreme Court found a right to same-sex
marriage under the U.S. Constitution, it would be supreme over state constitutional amendments,
state statutes, and state court decisions that define marriage as only being between one man and one
woman. See U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2. The following five states currently recognize same-sex
marriage: Massachusetts, Connecticut, Iowa, Vermont, and New Hampshire. See supra notes 80-93
and accompanying text. By deduction, there are forty-five states that recognize marriage as only
being between a man and a woman either by state statute, constitutional amendment, or court
decision. As a result, a constitutional right to same-sex marriage would have the effect of
overturning marriage laws in a total of forty-five states. See U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
205. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
206. See infra notes 203-14 and accompanying text.
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Process Clause will create important implications for freedom in this
country.2 07 The framers of the Constitution and succeeding generations of
jurists understood how the promise of liberty is preserved through
maintaining the appropriate balance of power between the federal and state
governments.208 Additionally, federalism in family law ensures that future
generations of citizens are inculcated with certain civic virtues and
republican ideals.209 State regulation in family law promotes a commitment
to autonomy, which causes people to value liberty and resist tyranny. 210 By
using the judicial power to expand the scope of the Fourteenth Amendment,
thereby intervening in the state's regulation of the domestic sphere, Article
III courts would be upsetting the federalist balance that has ensured the
preservation of this country's republican form of government for over 200
2
years. 11
Finally, an expansive interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment,
which includes a new right of same-sex marriage, would have the effect of
cutting off public debate on the civil definition of marriage when the states
are currently engaged in a thoughtful examination of the subject.2 12 When

207. See infra notes 208-11 and accompanying text.
208. See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST No. 51, supra note 175, at 321-23 (James Madison) (discussing
the importance of federalism and the separation of powers in providing a double security for the
rights of the people); Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 759 (1991) (describing how "federalism
secures to citizens the liberties that derive from the diffusion of sovereign power").
209. See supra note 58 and accompanying text. These ideals and virtues include participation in
the political system, respect for differing viewpoints, critical dialogue and deliberation, honesty,
reasonableness, and rational thought. Dailey, supra note 48, at 1835-40. Most importantly,
federalism in family law inculcates future generations of citizens with the republican virtue of
autonomy, see id. at 1840, which leads them to value liberty and resist tyranny, see Wardle, supra
note 48, at 232-33.
210. See supra note 58 and accompanying text.
211. See supra notes 207-10 and accompanying text. During the founding era of the United
States, there was concern that the Supremacy Clause and the Necessary and Proper Clause could be
used by the federal government to take away newly acquired liberties at the state and local level.
THE FEDERALIST No. 33, supra note 175, at 201-02 (Alexander Hamilton). Alexander Hamilton
articulately noted that laws that interfered with the sovereign domain of the states would not be
enacted pursuant to the federal government's powers as granted by the Constitution and, thus, would
not be the supreme law of the land. Id. at 204. In light of concern during the founding era, the
Fourteenth Amendment should create a similar concern about the potential abridgement of civil
liberties if the federal judiciary decides not to give greater weight to background principles of
federalism when confronted with newly proposed rights under the Equal Protection and Due Process
Clauses. See Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 720 (1997).
212. See supra notes 107, 172 and accompanying text. Public debate and reexamination of certain
norms is an essential part of this country's democratic system. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 735.
Without the ability to engage in public debate, states cannot make use of their traditional expertise in
the area of family law in order to develop alternative solutions on the issue of marriage. See id. at
716. Currently, states are determining whether to offer civil unions to same-sex couples as an
alternative to marriage. See, e.g., Hawaii Debates Same-Sex Unions, supra note 177 at A17
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assessing newly proposed rights under the Fourteenth Amendment, the U.S.
Supreme Court has articulated the importance of restraint in any context
where there is little guidance from the Constitution or established
precedent.213 The possibility that the Fourteenth Amendment could become
no more than an engine of the judiciary's policy preferences cautions against
finding a new constitutional right to same-sex marriage.214
VI.

CONCLUSION

Just as the Supreme Court has established and developed the doctrine of
judicial review and the right to privacy through its own case law,215 the
framers of the Constitution and the justices of the Supreme Court have
articulated the importance of federalism in family law.216 This domestic
relations doctrine recognized by the framers and the Court holds that states
should have the power to regulate matters pertaining to family life absent a
violation of individual rights as enumerated in the Constitution.217 The
rationale behind this doctrine is that domestic relations are quintessentially
and traditionally local and, thus, should be of state concern.218
The definition of marriage lies at the heart of what constitutes the core
(reporting on the debate in the Hawai'i state legislature to provide civil unions to same-sex couples);
Mansnerus, supra note 177, at Al (reporting on New Jersey's decision to provide civil unions to
same-sex couples in 2006). For example, California also initiated a domestic partnership program
for same-sex couples, which eventually included all the legal rights and benefits of marriage
available at the state level. Johnson, supra note 168, at 2159-60. As in Glucksberg,where the states
were engaged in a thoughtful examination of physician assisted suicide, it would be somewhat
premature for the federal judiciary to conclusively decide that same-sex marriage is the appropriate
solution with respect to the ongoing debate over government recognition of same-sex relationships,
see Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 716-20, especially given this country's tradition of defining marriage as
only being between one man and one woman, see supra notes 41-43 and accompanying text.
213. See supra notes 187-90 and accompanying text. Currently, there are no constitutional
provisions that directly address the issue of same-sex relationships or same-sex marriage, see supra
note 200 and accompanying text, and there are no Supreme Court cases, except Glucksberg, that are
directly on point with respect to this issue, see supra notes 117-201 and accompanying text. Romer
is distinguishable because Colorado's Amendment 2 had a much broader effect than Proposition 8.
See supra notes 117-43 and accompanying text. Lawrence is distinguishable because Justice
Kennedy specifically noted that the case did not involve governmental recognition of same-sex
relationships. See supra notes 144-79 and accompanying text. Loving is distinguishable because
the Supreme Court's holding with respect to the freedom to many was decided in the context of
invidious racial classifications. See supra notes 180-201 and accompanying text. When there is no
clear guidance with respect to a newly proposed right under the Fourteenth Amendment, the
Supreme Court has urged restraint in order for the federal judiciary to make a responsible decision
that does not have the effect of cutting off debate on an important matter of public concern. See
Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 720.
214. See supra notes 107, 172 and accompanying text.
215. See, e.g., Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 176-78 (1803) (establishing the power of judicial
review); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152-53 (1973) (creating a right to privacy to protect a
woman's right to have an abortion).
216. See supranotes 48-72 and accompanying text.
217. See supra notes 24, 68-72 and accompanying text.
218. See supranotes 48-58 and accompanying text.
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domain of family law. As a result, each state should be able to follow its
own methods of determining the definition of marriage for its people.21 9
California should be allowed to define marriage as being between one man
and one woman without federal government intervention,220 and
Massachusetts, Connecticut, Iowa, Vermont, New Hampshire, and the
District of Columbia likewise should be allowed to follow their own
constitutional processes in recognizing same-sex marriage.22 1
Currently, Supreme Court precedent does not support a finding that
there is a constitutional right to same-sex marriage.222 Romer should not be
relied on because Colorado's Amendment 2 affected general participatory
rights, while California's Proposition 8 only deals with the designation of
marriage.223 Additionally, Lawrence should not be relied on because Justice
Kennedy specifically mentioned that governmental recognition of same-sex
marriage was not at issue. 224 Finally, Loving should not control because the
Fourteenth Amendment should be viewed in light of the historical context of
Reconstruction. 225 Thus, Proposition 8 does not violate an individual right
found in the Constitution, and California should be allowed to regulate an
area as quintessentially local as family law without federal government
intervention.226
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219. See supra notes 48, 177 and accompanying text.
220. See supra note 134 and accompanying text.
221. See supra notes 80-93 and accompanying text.
222. See infra notes 223-25 and accompanying text.
223. See supra notes 117-43 and accompanying text.
224. See supra notes 144-79 and accompanying text.
225. See supra notes 180-201 and accompanying text.
226. See supra notes 215-18, 222-25 and accompanying text.
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